Michigan Journal of International Law
Volume 31

Issue 1

2009

The Use of Force Against States That Might Have Weapons of
Mass Destruction
Matthew C. Waxman
Columbia Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil
Part of the International Law Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the National Security
Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Matthew C. Waxman, The Use of Force Against States That Might Have Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (2009).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol31/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST STATES
THAT MIGHT HAVE WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Matthew C. Waxman*
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................

I.

2

USE OF FORCE DOCTRINE AND WEAPONS

5
A. Use of Force andAnticipatory Self-Defense ...................... 6
B. "PrecautionarySelf-Defense" and WMD ......................... 8
1. The Security Context of WMD ...................................
8
2. WMD and Strains on "Imminence" ....................11
3. "Precautionary Self-Defense" ........................
13
C. The Problem of IntelligenceLimitations.......................... 15
II. THREE APPROACHES ...............................................................
21
A. WMD and the Use of Force Debate.....................
22
1. The Traditional View .................................................
22
2. The Unilateralist View ..............................................
24
3. The Reasonable Necessity View .............................. 26
B. Three Approaches to Capability Uncertainty ................. 30
1. The Traditional View: A Process Approach ............. 31
2. The Unilateralist View: A Subjective
Standards Approach ................................................
41
3. The Reasonable Necessity View:
An Objective Standards Approach ...........................
47
4. Process and Objective Standards: Potential
Symbiosis of the Traditional
View and Reasonable Necessity View ...................... 54
IH. NEXT STEPS: DEVELOPING EVIDENTIARY NORMS ................. 57
A. How Much Uncertainty Is Reasonable?......................... 58
B. What Type of Evidence Is Reasonable?.......................... 62
1. Forensic Evidence .....................................................
62
2. Propensity Inferences ..............................................
66
C. Burden-Shifting and Risk Allocation .............................. 70
D. Embedded Policy Questions ............................................
75
OF M ASS D ESTRUCTION ...............................................................

CON CLU SION ............................................................................................

77

Associate Professor, Columbia Law School; Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on
Foreign Relations; Member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and
Law. I thank the following for their helpful comments: Kenneth Anderson, Philip Bobbitt,
Daniel Byman, Robert Chesney, Elbridge Colby, Michael Doyle, Jack Goldsmith, Robert
Jervis, David Kaye, Jens Ohlin, Vijay Padmanabhan, Deborah Pearlstein, Abraham Sofaer, and
Peter Spiro. I also thank the following students for their excellent research assistance: Bo
Simmons, David Hambrick, Johanna Skr7ypczyk, and Judith Tompkins.

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 3 1:1

"It is clear to anyone willing to face reality that the only reason
Saddam took the risk of refusing to submit his activities to U.N.
inspectorswas that he is exerting every muscle to build WMD."
-Margaret

Thatcher, June 17, 2002'

"We have yet to see a smoking gun that would convict Tehran."
-International Atomic Energy Agency Director
Mohammed ElBaradei, February 21, 20052
INTRODUCTION

The Iraq war rekindled debate--debate now further inflamed in discussions of Iran and North Korea-about the legal use of force to disarm
an adversary state believed to pose a threat of catastrophic attack, including with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).3 Coinciding with this
debate is the stark fact that intelligence about allegedly hostile states'
WMD 4 capabilities is and will remain limited. Assessments of WMD
arsenals and programs are prone to errors of the sort exemplified by former British Prime Minister Thatcher's comment, and often cannot be
proven (or disproven) to the level of certainty invoked by International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director ElBaradei.
How should international legal doctrine on the use of force handle
this intelligence problem?
One pole of the current use-of-force debate, most notably represented
by the George W. Bush administration, defends unilateral decisions to use
self-defensive force in the face of perceived WMD threats "even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack" (the
"unilateralist view.")5 The other pole holds that states cannot resort to force
absent U.N. Security Council authorization unless attacked first, except

1.
2.

Margaret Thatcher, Op-Ed., Don't Go Wobbly, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2002, at A18.
Erich Follath & Georg Mascolo, Auch al-Qaida will die Bombe [Al-Qaida also
Wants the Bomb], DER SPIEGEL, Feb. 21, 2005, at 116.
3.
For a general discussion of the strategic issues for U.S. policy, see generally
DANIEL BYMAN & MATTHEW WAXMAN, THE DYNAMICS OF COERCION: AMERICAN FOREIGN

POLICY AND THE LIMITS OF MILITARY MIGHT 201-25 (2002).

4.
For the purposes of this paper, I am primarily concerned with nuclear and viralbiological weapons, i.e., those capable of imposing catastrophic damage. The nature of
biological weapons threats differs significantly from that of nuclear weapons, and so therefore
do strategies for combating these threats. See Christopher F. Chyba, Toward Biological
Security, 8 FOREIGN AFF. 122, 122 (2002).
5.

THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA 15 (Sept. 2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY].
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perhaps in very narrow circumstances where a specifically identified
attack is "imminent" (the "traditional view").6
These schools share a belief that the proliferation of WMD poses
new challenges for international use of force rules, but they draw opposite conclusions. Those taking the unilateralist view believe that the
instantaneity and destructiveness of WMD threats render traditional
rules, especially an imminence requirement, too stringent.7 States cannot
be expected to bear the risk of a first strike while the U.N. Security
Council deliberates, perhaps without end. Those taking the traditional
view believe that the spread of WMD raises the danger of too lenient a
standard for precautionary use of force. In their view relaxing the standard opens the door to masked aggression and may spur states to pursue
WMD as deterrents or may create security instabilities among them.8
Within this polarized debate exists a third view, which I develop further and defend: the objective "reasonable necessity" approach holds that
the use of force against another state believed to pose a WMD threat is
justified when a reasonable state would conclude a WMD threat is sufficiently likely and severe that forceful measures are necessary.9
Events since the 2003 Iraq invasion have exposed a problem for all
three approaches, but especially the reasonable necessity approach:
whether or not a state has a WMD arsenal, or nearly has one, often cannot be determined to a high degree of certainty. For example, U.S.
intelligence assessments of all three "Axis of Evil" states' WMD capabilities contained major errors or uncertainties. Pre-war assessments that
Iraq had stockpiled chemical or biological weapons and was building a
nuclear bomb proved erroneous.' l Claims that Iran is racing towards a
weaponized nuclear capability have been called into question by a 2007
National Intelligence Council assessment." Even after North Korea
tested a nuclear weapon in 2006, questions remain about whether it has a
plutonium program, a uranium program, or both. 2
This Article argues that the most difficult future crises for which this
legal debate is most consequential will not resemble those described by
Prime Minister Thatcher or Director ElBaradei. Rather, in confronting
potentially hostile and aggressive states believed to pose a WMD threat,
6.
For an excellent summary of this debate, see Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of
Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV. 699 (2005) (outlining four schools of thought,
which he labels "strict-constructionist," "imminent threat," "qualitative threat," and "charteris-dead").
7.
See infra Part Il.A.2.
8.
See infra Part II.A.1.
9.
See infra Part ll.A.3.
10.
See infra notes 66-69.
11.
See infra notes 70-72.
12.
See infra notes 73-74.
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decisionmakers contemplating the use of force will face an intelligence
picture that is open to reasonable debate (contra Thatcher) and irresolvable to high levels of certainty (contra ElBaradei). This paper examines
how competing legal approaches deal with this epistemic problem.
If the threat of attack is a function of an adversary's intentions and
its capabilities, this epistemic problem represents a conceptual and practical shift from the challenges that the anticipatory self-defense rules and
the U.N. Charter were each developed to handle. In the past, the key
question was generally whether an adversary intended to attack.'3 Military capabilities could be assumed or assessed with a high level of
certainty, but the community of states needed rules or processes for adjudicating whether uncertain intentions warranted forceful preemptive or
anticipatory responses. 4 Crises involving WMD-seeking rogue states
pose uncertainty of both factors, and often the mere crossing (or perceived crossing) of the WMD capability threshold has dire and sudden
security and stability consequences." This Article argues that a sound
legal doctrinal approach must be able to operate effectively in that environment.
The unilateralist school deals with capability uncertainty with a subjective, or self-determined standard: the state contemplating the use of
force to head off a WMD threat must believe in good faith that the use of
force is necessary to forestall it. 6 This school accepts as inevitable that
states must and will make critical decisions amid substantial uncertainty.
The traditional school deals with capability uncertainty with process.'7 It
argues that because accurately discerning a state's capability is difficult,
the international community should rely on collective decisionmaking,
based as much as possible on assessments by international inspection
and oversight organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) to determine the magnitude of threats. The reasonable necessity
school proposes, usually through a combination of state practice and in-

13.
See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS
AND ARMED ATrACKS 97-108 (2002).
14.
See Jack S. Levy, Misperception and the Causes of War: TheoreticalLinkages and
Analytical Problems, 36 WORLD POL. 76, 96 (1983) ("Statesmen have always recognized that
intentions are more difficult to assess than capabilities'").
15.
One might object to the use of the term "uncertainty" here, preferring instead the
term "risk." Generally "risk" refers to situations where probabilities can be assigned to various
possible outcomes, whereas "uncertainty" refers to situations where outcomes can be identified but probabilities cannot be assigned to them. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE
SCENARIOS 146-47 (2007). Although estimating WMD capabilities may be thought of, strictly

speaking, in terms of risk, I prefer the term "uncertainty" for its other sense, connoting factual
ambiguity.
16.
17.

See infra Part II.B.2.
See infra Part II.B. 1.
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ternational institutional adjudication, flexible yet objective criteria to
guide decisionmaking about military force. 8
This Article aims to develop more fully how an objective reasonableness approach to WMD capability assessments would work, and
more generally how the law governing use of force should guide capability assessments. It begins in Part I with an analysis of the debate over the
international law regulating uses of force and the way each doctrinal
camp purports to operate in a world of WMD proliferation. Part II argues
that a key challenge for any doctrinal approach will be inevitable uncertainty about adversaries' WMD capability, and then examines how each
approach grapples with the epistemic problem of judging such capability
amid informational gaps and distortions. It argues that a reasonable necessity approach to use of force against WMD threats-and with it an
objective standard of assessing WMD capability--operating as a narrow
exception to formal U.N. Security Council authorization, best balances
competing risks in an environment of significant capability uncertainty.
However, it also argues that U.N. Security Council-driven processes and
an objective necessity approach are not mutually exclusive and can be
combined in reciprocally reinforcing ways.
An objective necessity approach prompts the questions: what level
of certainty is reasonable, and what evidentiary logic and assumptions
should guide that judgment? Part III explores these questions, and reveals how evidentiary principles reflect underlying policy choices about
balancing risks and combating proliferation. Even if one remains unconvinced by the objective necessity approach, the evidentiary issues raised
in Part Ill-and forced to the surface through objective reasonableness
analysis-are critical to the effective operation of the legal processes
advocated by the traditional view and its strict construction of the U.N.
Charter.
I. USE OF FORCE DOCTRINE AND WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION

International law on the use of force has traditionally allowed states
some leeway to defend themselves without having to suffer a first blow.
How much leeway is allowed is the source of much debate, and this debate has intensified as WMD proliferate. This Part charts that debate, and
then adds to it the emergent reality that states contemplating the use of
force are often unable to assess .with great confidence whether or not an
adversary truly has, or is about to acquire, a WMD arsenal.
18.

See infra Part II.B.3.
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A. Use of Force and Anticipatory Self-Defense

The international legal doctrine of anticipatory self-defense regulates
the use of military force against attacks that have not yet occurred. 9 The
classic formulation of the doctrine was articulated by Secretary of State
Daniel Webster in an 1841 exchange with his British counterparts. 20 British forces attacked the schooner Caroline in U.S. territory because they
expected it to ferry supplies across the border to Canada in aid of rebels
who were fighting the British rule. Webster objected, arguing that a right
of anticipatory self-defense arises only when there is a necessity of selfdefense that is "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation., 2' To those who accept its continuing
validity in the modern era, anticipatory self-defense is a narrow exception to the general U.N. Charter rule that armed force against another
state is prohibited unless authorized by the U.N. Security Council or,
once a state has been militarily attacked, in self-defense. 22
I say "to those who accept" the continuing validity of anticipatory
self-defense because some scholars argue that the U.N. Charter
deliberately overrode the rule and replaced it exclusively with collective
self-defense mechanisms administered by the Security Council.2 ' Article
51 of the U.N. Charter states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. '2' The strictest interpreters of this provision insist
19.
See Christopher Greenwood, InternationalLaw and the Pre-Emptive Use of Force:
Afghanistan, AI-Qaida and Iraq, in ESSAYS ON WAR IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 667, 672-76
(2006).
20.
See MICHAEL W. DOYLE, STRIKING FIRST: PREEMPTION AND PREVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 11-15 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2008); FRANCK, supra note 13, at
97-98.
21.
Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Lord Ashburton, British Plenipotentiary (Aug. 6, 1842), quoted in 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 217, at 412 (1906).
22.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (discussing use of force generally); see also id. art. 51
(discussing self-defense). For a discussion of minority views, see Murphy, supra note 6, at
708-10.
23.
See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 275-

76 (1963);

ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (2d ed. 2005); CHRISTINE GRAY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 112 (2000); LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS
BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 141-44 (1979); MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE POWER
AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW: INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY

AND PRACTICE OF

ENFORCEMENT 172-79 (2008); see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELFDEFENSE 171-72 (3d ed. 2001) (arguing for a more limited right of"interceptive" self-defense

when an armed attack is in progress but has not yet hit, such as Japanese vessels en route to
bomb Pearl Harbor).
24.
U.N. Charter art. 51.
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that the phrase "if an armed attack occurs" was intended to eliminate the
customary right of anticipatory self-defense."
The better view, upon which this paper is based, is that the "inherent
right of self-defense" to which Article 51 refers also incorporates anticipatory self-defense. The key debate concerns the conditions under which
anticipatory self-defense may be invoked. The majority of scholars
ac26
cept this general view, and state practice since 1945 reinforces it.
The basic policy behind international self-defense doctrine is to
promote global order by permitting states sufficient leeway to respond to
expected security threats while not creating an exception so broad to the
baseline prohibition of force that it swallows the rule, or is used
pretextually to mask aggression. Because the policy involves predicting
future actions by an expected aggressor, application of the anticipatory
self-defense doctrine, or what more broadly could be called the
"precautionary self-defense" doctrine, risks false positives and false
negatives. False positives are uses of military force in self-defense against
expected attacks that would not have actually materialized. They are
problematic because of their immediate destructive material and diplomatic
effects, as well as their potential to escalate into a larger war or to create
additional insecurity among other states. False negatives are abstentions
from using self-defensive military force due to a mistaken assessment that
an adversary would not attack first. They are problematic because they
result in and reward preventable aggression. Anticipatory self-defense
17
rules aim to calibrate the risk of false positives and false negatives.
The imminence requirement in traditional anticipatory self-defense
doctrine can be understood as a legal device for reducing false positives,
or unnecessary resorts to self-defensive force.28 Requiring that a specific
attack be about to occur helps ensure that a defender exhaust other,
non-forcible means, and it reduces the likelihood of mistakes, insofar as
25.
See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 275-76; GRAY, supra note 23, at 112; see
also O'CONNELL, supra note 23, at 172-79 (advocating a restrictive interpretation of the
"armed attack"-based self-defense exception of Article 51).
26.
See FRANCK, supra note 13, at 107-08. Any such use of force is always limited by
other international legal principles, including necessity and proportionality. See Louis Henkin,
The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE 37, 45 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1991).
27.
On the purposes underlying use of force rules and their interpretation as a means of
balancing false positives and negatives, see W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the
Laws of War, 97 Am.J. INT'L L. 82, 83-84 (2003) (describing the International Court of Justice's
(ICJ) decision in Militaryand ParamilitaryActivities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), as
reflecting the Court's effort to balance under-use versus over-use of military force).
28.
See FRANCK, supra note 13, at 107 ("In the right circumstances, [anticipatory selfdefense] can be a prescient measure that, at low cost, extinguishes the fuse of a power-keg. In
the wrong circumstances, it can cause the very calamity it anticipates."). See generally Eric A.
Posner & Alan 0. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum, 93 GEO. L.J. 993 (2005).
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waiting until that point is more likely to expose an adversary's true intentions, perhaps through visible preparations. An imminence requirement
therefore helps distinguish an adversary's general attitude of hostility
from a maturated intention to attack.29
B. "PrecautionarySelf-Defense" and WMD
The proliferation of WMD complicates the anticipatory self-defense
debate because such technology raises the stakes of errors (of both kinds,
but especially of false negatives). What sets WMD apart from other
arsenals is their ability to inflict massive damage in a short period of
time. An adversary with WMD may be able to strike with little or no
notice, after which it may be too late to defend against the devastating
impact. Moreover, a state's mere possession of WMD allows it to wield a
significant threat, radically expanding its ability to intimidate other states
or international actors. It is in part for these reasons that the U.N.
Security Council declared in Resolution 1540 that the "proliferation of
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of
delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security."3'
1. The Security Context of WMD
The problem of applying the anticipatory self-defense doctrine in a
world of WMD proliferation is not a new one, but it has been exacerbated in recent years. As Rosalyn Higgins of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) remarked about fifteen years ago, "in a nuclear age, common sense cannot require one to interpret an ambiguous provision in a
text in a way that requires a state passively to accept its fate before it can
defend itself."'" And thirty years before that, in President Kennedy's address to the nation during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, he explained,
We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of
weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security
to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive
and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their
deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace. 32

29.
30.
31.

See generally Posner & Sykes, supra note 28, at 1000.
S.C. Res. 1540, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

How

WE

USE IT 242 (1994).

32.
President John E Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People on
the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba (radio & television broadcast Oct. 22, 1962), available at
http://www.jfklibrary.org/jfkl/cmc/j 102262.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
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At the time Kennedy spoke, fewer than a half-dozen countries had,
or were even developing, significant WMD capabilities.33 Today, however, an estimated nine countries already have nuclear weapons. 34 There
are at least seven other countries that have indicated an interest in nuclear weapons and are currently seeking to expand their nuclear energy
programs." Meanwhile, an estimated eighteen countries now have, or are
likely to have, chemical or biological weapons capabilities ,

and the ca

pabilities of those states that are actively pursuing WMD programs will
likely improve over the next decade.
Suspected WMD arsenals dramatically alter the strategic calculus of
potential target states. An adversary with WMD may be able to strike
with little or no notice, foreclosing the possibility of diplomacy and
other methods of conflict avoidance that are usually available in the context of conventional war. Moreover, once a WMD attack is initiated, the
targeted state is likely to have limited options for protecting its population and strategic assets.37

Beyond the concern of an actual attack, mere possession of a WMD
capability by a hostile or aggressive state poses an array of dangers to
other states. The WMD capability can serve as a powerful deterrent, affording its wielder greater freedom to undertake aggressive military and
diplomatic actions. WMD-armed states may be more tempted to employ
conventional or asymmetric force to achieve goals given the diminished
likelihood of military counteraction or unfavorable escalation.38 Both the
33.
See National Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Notebook: Global Nuclear
Stockpiles, 1945-2006, 62 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 64 (2006), available at http://
thebulletin.metapress.com/content/c4l2O650912x74k7/fulltext.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
34.
See PAUL K. KERR, CRS REPORT: NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND MISSILES: STATUS AND TRENDS 6 (Feb. 20, 2008), available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/nuke/RL30699.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2009); see also Federation of American Scientists, Status of World Nuclear Forces, http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nukestatus.html
(last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
35.
See COMM'N ON THE PREVENTION OF WMD PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM,
WORLD

AT

RISK:

PROLIFERATION

THE REPORT

AND

TERRORISM

OF THE COMMISSION

ON

61-62 (2008) [hereinafter

THE PREVENTION
GRAHAM-TALENT

OF

WMD

REPORT];

Council on Foreign Relations, Issue Brief: The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,
www.cfr.org/publication/ 18984/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
36.
See KERR, supra note 34, at 20.
37.
Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-Emptive Use of Force:
Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 7, 16 (referring to the "impossibility for [a] State to afford its population any effective protection once the attack has been
launched"). This fact also underlies much of the debate on Ballistic Missile Defense. See generally BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (Ashton B. Carter & David N. Schwartz, eds., 1984);

E. O'HANLON,
(2001).

JAMES M. LINDSAY & MICHAEL
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

DEFENDING AMERICA: THE CASE FOR LIMITED

38.
For a discussion of what political scientists often call this "stability-instability paradox," see Glenn H. Snyder, The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror, in THE BALANCE
OF POWER AND THE BALANCE OF TERROR

184 (Paul Seabury ed., 1965).
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WMD threat itself and this increase in the perceived utility of other violence can be used to intimidate other states and international actors.3 9
The "profile" of proliferating states magnifies the risk of deterrenceshielded aggression and additional proliferation once they develop
WMD capabilities. These states likely violated international law
throughout their development of WMD, and so are likely to feel relatively unconstrained by norms governing both proliferation and the use
of force.40 They are also quintessential "non status quo" states, in that
they presumably sought their WMD capability out of dissatisfaction with
the prior balance of power or international order.'
WMD possession also raises the danger of further proliferation in
several ways. First, states that are threatened by this new WMD capability may attempt to acquire their own WMD as a deterrent, sparking arms
races.4 2 Second, WMD development increases the risks that a state may
share technology or materials with other states aspiring to attain WMD
See James Steinberg, Preventive Force in US National Security Strategy, 47 SUR55, 60 (2005). But see Richard K. Betts, UniversalDeterrenceor Conceptual Collapse?
Liberal Pessimism and Utopian Realism, in THE COMING CRISIS: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION,
U.S. INTERESTS, AND WORLD ORDER 51, 84 (Victor A. Utgoff ed., 2000) [hereinafter THE
39.

VIVAL

COMING CRISIS]

("Utopian realism [i.e., proliferation optimism as exemplified by Waltz]

should not convince us to promote the spread of WMD, but it may hold out some hope if nonproliferation fails"); John J. Mearsheimer, The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent, 72
FOREIGN An'. 50, 51 (1993) ("[N]uclear proliferation sometimes promotes peace ...");
John
J. Mearsheimer, Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1990, at
35, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/foreign/mearsh.htm (last visited Oct. 5,
2009) ("[W]ell-managed proliferation could produce an order nearly as stable as that of the
Long Peace."); Scott Sagan et al., A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster,
COLUM. J. INT. AFF., Spring-Summer 2007, at 136-38 (citing Waltz's comments).
40. See BYMAN & WAXMAN, supra note 3, at 204-07; see also infra notes 308-311 and
accompanying text (discussing these correlations and the problem of cognitive biases in threat
assessment).
41.
See Lawrence Freedman, Prevention, Not Preemption, 26 WASH. Q. 105, 112-13
(2003) ("Instead of a status quo, risk-averse adversary against whom deterrence might work,
the United States now has gamblers for enemies... ");Stephen M. Walt, Containing Rogues
and Renegades: Coalition Strategies and Counterproliferation,in THE COMING CRISIS, supra
note 39, at 191, 194-95 ("[V]irtually all analysts regard [rogue] regimes as fundamentally
hostile to the United States. . . . [R]ogue states are assumed to have inherently revisionist
aims, meaning that they seek to alter the status quo for reasons other than a desire to improve
their own security."). Walt thinks these assertions "should not be accepted uncritically" and
gives more weight to the idea that "their aggressive behavior stems largely from insecurity
rather than ideological conviction or a desire for glory or material gain:' but that a desire to
obtain WMD in order to ameliorate feelings of insecurity does indicate dissatisfaction with the
international balance of power. See id. at 196.
42. See CONG. COMM'N ON STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE U.S., INTERIM REPORT 4
(2008), available at http://www.usip.org/files/file/strategic-posturecommissioninterim
report.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2009) ("If Iran and North Korea proceed unchecked to build
nuclear arsenals, there is a serious possibility of a cascade of proliferation following."); INT'L
SEC.

ADVISORY

BD.,

REPORT

ON

DISCOURAGING

A

CASCADE

OF

NUCLEAR

WEAPONS

(2007) available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ISAB%20-%2ONuclear%
20Cascade%20Report.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
STATES
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capability, or could even transfer technology, materials, or weapons to
non-state actors. 3
2. WMD and Strains on "Imminence"
The proliferation of WMD complicates the anticipatory self-defense
debate by frustrating aspects of the traditional imminence formulation
and raising the stakes of errors, especially false negatives.4 Once in the
hands of a hostile state, WMD capabilities can pose threats that are very
different from the class of threats out of which the imminence requirement-summed up so well in the Carolineexchange-grew. As a result,
many scholars and policymakers have expressed concern that technological changes and WMD proliferation are outstripping traditional
imminence doctrine. 4
Traditional imminence depends heavily on a temporal restriction,
' 6
whereby force is only permitted "during the last window of opportunity.
The technological nature of WMD and their delivery can make it
impossible to discern this "last chance" period, limiting the extent to
which the imminence requirement can be used to reduce uncertainty about
a WMD-armed adversary's true intentions. In a conventional context, a
state's decision to attack was usually accompanied by a perceptible
mobilization of forces, while a WMD threat may only become imminent
with the crystallization of the aggressor's intention to attack.47 This
43.
See William J. Broad et al., A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation:How Pakistani Built
His Network, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2004/02/12/intemational/asia/12NUKE.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2009); David E. Sanger &
William J. Broad, From Rogue Nuclear Programs, Web of Trails Leads to Pakistan,
N.Y. TIms, Jan. 4, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/04/intemational/04NUKE.html
(last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
44.
See ELIZABETH WILMSHURST, CHATHAM HOUSE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW ON THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES IN SELF-DEFENSE 9 (2005) ("While the possession of
WMD without a hostile intent to launch an attack does not in itself give rise to a right of selfdefence, the difficulty of determining intent and the catastrophic consequences of making an
error will be relevant factors in any determination of 'imminence'....").
45.
See, e.g., id. at 8; DOYLE, supra note 20, at 11-17; NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY,
supra note 5, at 15 ("We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and
objectives of today's adversaries."); Greenwood, supra note 37, at 16; Abraham D. Sofaer, On
the Necessity of Pre-emption, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 209 (2003); Terence Taylor, The End of
Imminence? 27 WASH. Q. 57 (2004); Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks on the
President's National Security Strategy at the Waldorf-Astoria, (Oct. 1, 2002) ("[N]ew technology requires new thinking about when a threat actually becomes 'imminent'."); see also
Murphy, supra note 6, at 715-17 (discussing the "qualitative threat" school of thought).
46.
Michael N. Schmitt, Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in InternationalLaw,
2002 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS 53, 110.
47.
Walter B. Slocombe, Force, Pre-Emption and Legitimacy, 45 SURVIVAL 117, 125
(2003) ("The traditional concept of 'imminence' assumed a context where the need for mobilisation and other preparation meant that there was a realistic prospect of warning of an
attack."); Taylor, supra note 45, at 66.
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vanishing of the intentions-signaling mobilization period, combined with
these weapons' catastrophic potential and the limits of protective means
after an attack has commenced, severely restricts the opportunities for
self-defense afforded by the traditional concept of imminence.
As a related problem, the broader dangers of WMD possession become "imminent" not immediately prior to a WMD attack, but before a
state's WMD program reaches a sufficient stage of development. Because these weapons can be used with little warning and are capable of
causing extraordinary damage, any rational state would view their possession by a hostile actor as a matter of grave concern.4 '8 Additionally,
mere possession can create serious collateral dangers, by acting as a
shield for other forms of aggression and unfavorably altering the regional security dynamic. 49 All this effectively shifts a substantial portion
of contemporary security risks outside the ambit of traditional imminence, diminishing the self-defense value of following the principle.
These types of complications for self-defense rules have generated
widespread belief that legal doctrine, and the concept of imminence in
particular, needs to be updated in light of contemporary threats such as
the proliferation of WMD. 50 While these changes in the threat environment by themselves do not compel the conclusion that self-defense rules
need to be broadened (since one may believe such an expansion would
create a greater countervailing danger of abuse), a range of experts have
proposed•51remedial loosening of the traditionally understood imminence
requirement. In the words of one such expert,
[t]he right of anticipatory self-defence by definition presupposes
a right to act while action is still possible. If waiting for "immi48.
As Ivo Daalder observes, "the very possession of weapons of mass destruction by
some countries can pose an existential threat, whether or not their actual use is truly imminent." Ivo H. Daalder, Beyond Preemption:An Overview, in BEYOND PREEMPTION 1, 8 (Ivo H.
Daalder ed., 2007).
49.
See Betts, supra note 39, at 61-62 ("Rational strategic reasons to want WMD include: to deter the use of WMD against one's own country; to redress inferiority in
conventional military capabilities by threatening to escalate in retaliation against an enemy's
conventional attack; and to coerce an adversary into political concessions."); Barry Posen &
Andrew L. Ross, Competing Visions for U.S. GrandStrategy, 21 INT'L SECURITY 5, 25 (1996)
(arguing that because democracies are extremely casualty-sensitive, the risk of a nuclear attack
even from a state with a very small nuclear arsenal can alter their behavior, and might even
"discourage them from coming to the assistance of a country in trouble"); Sagan et al., supra
note 39, at 139 ("[There is a] danger of nuclear weapons promoting aggression of the state
which holds them-that is, acquiring the protection of a nuclear shield which will enable the
state to be more aggressive in a conventional manner.").
50.
As Terence Taylor has warned, "[i]nternational law, by its inherently reactive nature, risks evolving too slowly to define the proper response to this already apparent
challenge." Taylor, supra note 45, at 59.
51.
See supra note 45.
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nence" means waiting until it is no longer possible to act effectively, the victim is left no alternative to suffering the first blow.
So interpreted, the "right" would be illusory.52
3. "Precautionary Self-Defense"
One might immediately object to this previous discussion as conflating two concepts, preemptive (or anticipatory) and preventive force.
Generally, preemption refers to the use of force to avert an expected attack that is about to occur.53 An oft-cited example is Israel's surprise
strikes on its Arab neighbors in 1967, based on its professed belief that
the Arab states were on the verge of attacking (although recent historical
analysis has cast some doubt on the certainty and accuracy of those beliefs) . Prevention refers to the use of force to avoid an emerging state of
affairs in which a threat would be more likely or increasingly dire.55 An
example is Israel's 1981 attack on Iraq's uncompleted Osiraq nuclear
facility, based on the Israeli government's belief that once Iraq had a nuclear weapons capability it would be in a strong position to threaten
Israel.56 The main conceptual differences between the two concepts are
temporal and speculative, or how imminent and concrete a threat must be
to trigger self-defense rights. 7
For the purposes of this paper, I use the inclusive term "precautionary self-defense" to denote the broad range of decisions to use force to
forestall expected dangers before an actual attack. In other words, precautionary defense includes anticipatory defense (where specific attack
is imminent), as well as a subset of preventive defense (where a specific
attack may not be imminent but a grave security risk brought about by a
hostile state's capability development is likely).
Especially in the WMD context, the lines between anticipatory, preemptive, and preventive force tend to blur. Because WMD can often be
52.
Slocombe, supra note 47, at 125. Walter Slocombe was the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy during the Clinton administration.
53.
See RACHEL BZOSTEK, WHY NOT PREEMPT? SECURITY, LAW, NORMS, AND ANTICIPATORY MILITARY ACTIVITIES 9-23 (2008).
54.
See MICHAEL B. OREN, SIX DAYS OF WAR: JUNE 1967 AND THE MAKING OF THE
MODERN MIDDLE EAST 61-169 (2002).
55.
See BZOSTEK, supra note 53, at 9-13; DOYLE, supra note 20, at 25.
56.
See Shai Feldman, The Bombing of Osiraq-Revisited, 7 INT'L SECURITY

(1982).
57.

114, 114

See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HIS-

74-75 (2d ed. 1992); Dan Reiter, Exploding the Powder Keg Myth:
Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen, 20 INT'L SECURITY 5, 6-7 (1995) ("A war is preemptive if it breaks out primarily because the attacker feels that it will itself be the target of a
military attack in the short term ....This definition is limited to perceptions of short-term
threats to national security: in conutast, the term preventive war is used for a war that begins
when a state attacks because it feels that in the longer term (usually the next few years) it will
be attacked or will suffer relatively increasing strategic inferiority.").
TORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
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used without warning, the temporal proximity of a threat may be impossible to determine objectively. As a result, it may become unworkable to
distinguish clearly between "distant" and "imminent" threats, and so
between prevention and preemption."
Moreover, all three legal approaches discussed implicitly contemplate the possibility of the preemptive or preventive use of force (that is,
prior to the point of imminent attack).5 9 Their difference is in how to
regulate legally that decisionmaking, and even more specifically how to
measure a component of the necessary legal conditions (by requiring
process versus good faith versus reasonableness assessments). This paper does not advance a complete argument about the ultimate policy
merits of preemptive and preventive uses of force, although it shows how
the legal issues and policy issues are intertwined. 6° Rather, it asks: If the
legal regime were to permit uses of force against a hostile state under
certain circumstances, how should those6 circumstances be judged, in
light of emergent intelligence limitations?
Notice the important assumption of a "hostile" state. Of course, not
all states-or even many states-with WMD exhibit sufficient hostile
intentions to warrant forceful counter-action as a matter of law or policy.
Indeed, I assume that those conditions will be quite rare. While the threat
posed by a WMD-armed or WMD-arming state is a composite of its intentions and its capabilities, this paper gives a deliberately incomplete
treatment of a WMD threat's legal appraisal by attempting to isolate the
58.
CENTURY

See PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
447-48 (2008). But see WILMSHURST, supra note 44, at 9 ("To the extent that a

doctrine of 'pre-emption' encompasses a right to respond to threats which have not yet crystallized but which might materialise at some time in the future, such a doctrine (sometimes
called 'preventive defence') has no basis in international law.").
59.
See The Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 190, U.N. Doc. A/59/565
(Dec. 2, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf (last visited Oct. 5,
2009) [hereinafter U.N. High-Level Panel] (taking the traditionalist view and stating that "if
there are good arguments for preventive military action, with good evidence to support them,
they should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize such action if it chooses to").
60.
See Slocombe, supra note 47, at 126-28, for a prudential case against preemptive
use of force to deal with WMD threats.
61.
As just explained, all three regulatory modes-process, subjective standard, and
objective standard-theoretically permit precautionary force under certain circumstances. In
practice, we can expect the process approach virtually always to be the least permissive, and
the subjective the most permissive, because as one moves from subjective to objective to process analysis, the latter will almost always include satisfaction of the former. That is, whenever
a reasonable state would conclude that force is warranted (because of reasonable belief about
requisite intent and capability), some single state or group of states contemplating the use of
the force can also be expected to take that view in good faith. And whenever the process approach-i.e., through U.N. Security Council deliberation-would conclude that force is
warranted, so too would a hypothesized reasonable state, or else it would be virtually impossible to achieve sufficient voting consensus in the Council.
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capability assessment variable. To this end, I assume some requisite level
of hostile or destabilizing intentions as viewed through the eyes of those
states contemplating force in response.
To be very clear, I am not arguing that WMD possession or pursuit
alone is ever sufficient legal cause for precautionary force. Adversary
capability or capability development is a necessary but not sufficient
condition of legal precautionary force. This paper focuses on the capability part of the equation, although some of the analytical principles and
logic it explores could apply to intentions as well.
C. The Problem of Intelligence Limitations
A lesson of the past few decades-a lesson displayed dramatically in
recent years-is that information about an adversary or rogue state's
WMD capability is often murky or incomplete. Intelligence assessments
can turn out to be widely off-mark. A major challenge facing national
security decisionmakers will likely be not what to do about a hostile
adversary that has WMD, but what to do about a hostile adversary that
might have WMD.
The most obvious example of this problem is Iraq, although there are
other examples from both before and after the 2003 invasion, and
examples of both overestimating and underestimating WMD capabilities.
Israel's 1981 assessment before it bombed Osiraq that Iraq was very
close to achieving an operational nuclear arsenal was refuted by afterthe-fact analyses. 62 Following the 1991 Gulf War, the United States and
the international community more broadly discovered that they had
vastly underestimated Iraq's progress toward a nuclear weapon
capability. 6 In 1998 the United States government was caught off-guard
by India's test of a nuclear weapon, 64 followed quickly by Pakistan's. 6
The embarrassing failure to find WMD in Iraq led to the
appointment of an executive-mandated investigatory commission, the
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission), cochaired by former Judge Laurence Silberman and former Senator
Charles Robb. 66 With regard to Iraq, the Commission concluded that the
62.
63.

See Richard K. Betts, The Osirak Fallacy,NAT'L INT., Spring 2006, at 22.
David A. Kay, Denial and Deception Practices of WMD Proliferators: Iraq and

Beyond, 18 WASH. Q., Winter 1995, at 85.

64.
See STROBE TALBOTT, ENGAGING INDIA: DIPLOMACY, DEMOCRACY, AND THE BOMB
2-3 (2004).
65.
See Dexter Filkins, PakistanExplodes 5 Nuclear Devices in Response to India, L.A.
TIMES,

May 29, 1998, at Al.

66.
See Douglas Jehl, Bush Sets Panel on intelligence Before Iraq War, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 2004, at Al.
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Bush administration did not deliberately manipulate intelligence but that
the intelligence system itself produced a faulty assessment.67 More
broadly, it concluded that U.S. and international capabilities to detect
and accurately assess WMD capabilities are, and will remain, limited.6
Another major study concluded that "[i]n the Iraqi case, arguably the
three best intelligence services in the world-those of the United States,
Great Britain, and Israel-proved tragically unequal to the task" of
providing accurate intelligence on emerging threats.69
Controversy currently surrounds Iran's alleged nuclear weapons development program.0 In his February 2005 State of the Union Address,
President Bush declared that, "[t]oday, Iran ...[is] pursuing nuclear
weapons," but a November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate concluded that, at the time, Iran's enrichment program did not have a
military dimension but that Iran could develop military nuclear capabilities in the near future.7" Debates continue within intelligence
communities about Iran's nuclear capabilities and ambitions, yet as
IAEA Director ElBaradei reminds us, "[w]e have yet to see a smoking
gun that would convict Tehran." 2
Even in the case of North Korea, now a confirmed nuclear power,
huge questions remain concerning the nature and scope of its WMD program.73 North Korea conducted a plutonium-based nuclear test in 2006,
even after which American intelligence agencies reportedly admitted
67.

See THE COMMISSION ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES

REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED

STATES 3, 51 (2005), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/report/wmd-report.pdf
(last visited Oct. 5, 2009) [hereinafter WMD COMMISSION REPORT].
68.
See id. at 517.
69.
JOSEPH CIRINCIONE ET AL., CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL
PEACE, WMD IN IRAQ: EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS 61 (2004), available at http:II
www.camegieendowment.org/files/Iraq3FullText.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
70.
See GRAHAM-TALENT REPORT, supra note 35, at 62, 63 ("[OQn September 29, 2008,
IAEA Director General EtBaradei [noted that there is an] '... absence of full clarity about
Iran's past and present nuclear program."'). This uncertainty about the status of an Iranian
nuclear weapons program has been ongoing for almost a decade. Id. at 62.
71.
See NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, IRAN:
NUCLEAR INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES (2007), available at http://www.dni.gov/press_
releases/20071203_release.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
72.
Karen DeYoung & Michael D. Shear, U.S., Allies Say Iran Has Secret Nuclear
Facility, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comwpdyn/content/article/2009/09/25/AR2009092500289.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2009) (reporting
recent disclosures by the Iran); Follath & Mascolo, supra note 2; see also George Jahn, Nuke
Agency Says Iran Can Make Bomb, Assoc. PRESS, Sept. 17, 2009, available at http://
news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090917/ap-on-re_eu/euirannuclear (last visited Oct. 5, 2009) (discussing intelligence assessments of Iran's nuclear program).
73.
STAFF OF H. PERMANENT SELECT COMM.ON INTELLIGENCE, SUBCOMM. ON INTELLIGENCE POL'Y, RECOGNIZING NORTH KOREA AS A STRATEGIC THREAT: AN INTELLIGENCE

CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED STATES 5, 6 (2005), available at http://intelligence.house.gov/
Media/PDFS/NorthKoreaReport092806.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
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serious doubts about the sophistication, competence, and even existence
of a parallel North Korea's uranium enrichment program.74
The problem of capability uncertainty is not going away anytime
soon, and it may grow." There are several reasons why these existing
information gaps about WMD capabilities and programs will not be substantially closed. These include systemic intelligence deficiencies,
inspection and verification weaknesses, the nature of modem WMD
technologies, and concealment efforts by proliferators. 6
National intelligence systems are insufficient to meet expanding
demands in this area." While there have been a number of commissions
and studies dedicated to improving intelligence related to WMD
proliferation, even the most positive assessments conclude that the
demands will be difficult to meet,78 and most estimations conclude that
major intelligence lapses are virtually inevitable.7 9

74.
See David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, US. Concedes Uncertaintyon Korean Uranium Effort, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007, at A1 (reporting that while the intelligence community's
initial assessment based on North Korea's purchase of some twenty centrifuges from Pakistan
was still factually correct, nothing had taken place since the sale to further corroborate North
Korea's desire to use the centrifuges to develop a vast uranium enrichment program).
75.
See DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 289 (2009).
76.
See supra notes 66-74; infra notes 77-97.
77.
See, e.g., WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 67, at 297-98 ("[A]gencies having responsibility for WMD terrorism are also understaffed, and the few experts that do exist
are suffering from burnout."); GRAHAM-TALENT REPORT, supra note 35, at 97 ("Because of
attrition and hiring freezes during the 1990s, there are few midcareer analysts.").
78.
This difficulty is attributed to both the substance of the solutions, see, e.g., WMD
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 67, at 26 ("There is no quick fix for tradecraft problems."),
and the failure to implement some of the proposed solutions, see, e.g., GRAHAM-TALENT REPORT, supra note 35, at xxvi (stating that implementation has been limited to defense,
intelligence, and homeland security); WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 67, at 539.
79.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, UNCERTAIN SHIELD: THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IN
THE THROES OF REFORM 44 (2006); see also Robert Jervis, Reports, Politics, and Intelligence
Failures: The Case of Iraq, 29 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 3, 10-12 (2006) ("[I]ntelligence failures
have occurred in all countries and all eras"), available at http://www.columbia.edu/
cu/siwps/publication-files/Intelligence%20reform JERVIS.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2009);
David Kahn, The Rise of Intelligence, 85 FOREIGN AF., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 125, 134 ("[Intelligence] will never be decisive on its own."); Paul R. Pillar, Intelligent Design? The Unending
Saga of Intelligence Reform, 87 FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2008, at 138, 144 ("Betts is correct
in arguing that these inherent enemies constitute an almost insurmountable obstacle and that
intelligence failures are not only inevitable but natural. [As Betts notes,] '[t]he awful truth...
is that the best of intelligence systems will have big failures."'). Even the WMD Commission
Report is not very optimistic about its own recommendations' potential for success. See WMD
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 67, at 46 ("Stealing [WMD] secrets [through intelligence
efforts] ... is no easy task, and failure is more common than success."); id. at 253 (asserting
that "it is apparent .. . that the [Intelligence] Community is not well-postured to replicate" its
success in detecting WMD capabilities in Libya).
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International inspections regimes are similarly limited in their ability
to generate certainty with regard to the existence of WMD arsenals.Y
One problem is the insufficient technical capabilities of international
inspection agencies.8 Another problem, especially with respect to
chemical and biological weapons, is the limited authority or mandate of
international inspection regimes.82 Even if those issues are overcome, it
has been hard for inspectors to agree on conclusions once they obtain
significant findings.83
Another obstacle to closing intelligence gaps about WMD capabilities and programs concerns the nature of modern WMD technology. 4
Many of the components that go into WMD are dual use (that is, able to
80.

See John Hart & Vitaly Fedchenko, WMD Inspection and Verification Regimes:

Political and Technical Challenges, in

COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

95, 96

(Nathan E. Busch & Daniel H. Joyner eds., 2009) ("The fundamental challenge in carrying out
any verification assessment is that, in the absence of an indisputable violation ... uncertainty
that the state is adhering to its obligations can exist."); see also George Jahn, UN: New Uranium Traces Found in Syria, ABC NEWS, June 5, 2009, available at http://
abcnews.go.com/Intemational/wireStory?id=7767362 (last visited Oct. 5, 2009) (describing
the inability of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to develop an accurate picture
of Iranian or Syrian nuclear programs despite inspections).
81.
See Hart & Fedchenko, supra note 80, at 101-08 (discussing IAEA's technical
limitations); Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 35 (discussing a "lack of adequate
verification and enforcement mechanisms available to the IAEA"). This is especially true with
regard to biological weapons inspections. Stephen Black, UNSCOM and the Iraqi Biological
Weapons Program: Implications for Arms Control, 18 POL. & LIFE Sci. 62, 63 (1999) (noting
the "technical complexities inherent to [biological weapons] arms control").
82.
For example, the IAEA has substantial authority to inspect activities related to nuclear fuel-cycle activities, but has very little capacity to inspect items and activities suggestive
of weaponization in the absence of a finding of nuclear materials. Mohamed ElBaradei, Dir.
Gen., IAEA, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Arms Control: Are We Making Progress? 3 (Nov.
7, 2005), available at http://www.camegieendowment.org/static/npp/2005conference/
presentations/elbaradei.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2009) ("[T]he Agency's legal authority to investigate possible parallel weaponization activity is limited, absent some nexus linking the
activity to nuclear material."); Ivo Daalder & Jan Lodal, The Logic of Zero: Toward a World
Without Nuclear Weapons, 87 FOREIGN Arr., Nov.-Dec. 2008, at 80, 88 (explaining that the
IAEA "has limited authority to inspect suspect sites"). Similar problems curtail the effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention, which lacks a substantive inspectorate and can
only be activated through the use of "challenge inspections" that are politically sensitive and
risky for a state to request. See Hart & Fedchenko, supra note 80, at 102.
83.
See Jack M. Beard, The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes:
The Case of the Biological Weapons Convention, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 271, 302 (2007) ("[I]n
1992 the United States, Britain, and Russia undertook to ascertain BWC compliance through a
series of voluntary visits to nonmilitary sites of concern under the nonbinding 'Trilateral
Framework Agreement'. .. [but] participants could not agree on the implications of what they
had observed during their visits.").
84.
Ashton Carter, How to Counter WMDs, 83 FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 72,
83 ("WMD activities are inherently difficult to monitor. It is comparatively easy to keep tabs
on the size and disposition of armies, the numbers and types of conventional weaponry such as
tanks and aircraft, and even the operational doctrines and plans of military establishments ....
By their nature, in contrast, WMD concentrate destructive power in small packages and tight
groups.") (emphasis added).
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serve civilian as well as military roles), which severely complicates differentiating legitimate from potentially hostile efforts." Consequently,
this makes "some of the weapons that would be most dangerous in the
hands of terrorists or rogue nations ...difficult to detect. ' 6 According to
one expert, "[tihere are very few activities, materials or equipment unambiguously associated with the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and
the chances are slim that the IAEA would detect one that was. 8 7 Accurate capability assessment therefore requires understanding and judging
a suspect state's
intentions for how it plans to use technologies or com88
ponent parts.

Additionally, WMD are easy to conceal-in some cases increasingly
so-which adds to the difficulty in tracking them. Nuclear power
facilities can be used as cover for clandestine nuclear weapons
programs 89 and weapons-grade uranium can be shielded from traditional
detection techniques. 90 Biological and chemical weapons are easy to hide
because they can be manufactured in commercial buildings lacking
suspicious signatures. 9' Biological weapons in particular are easily
hidden.92 Bioweapons labs can be concealed within routine research labs,
pharmaceutical manufacturing sites, or vaccine production labs.93 WMD
can increasingly be produced with very little lead time, which has the
effect of lowering the window of opportunity that the intelligence
community has to detect them.94
A further reason why intelligence gaps about WMD capabilities and
programs cannot be closed is fairly obvious but quite relevant: "nations
and terrorist groups do not easily part with their secrets-and they guard
nothing more jealously than secrets related to nuclear, biological, and

85.
See GRAHAM-TALENT REPORT, supra note 35, at 35; WMD COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 67, at 521.
86.
WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 67, at 4; see also GRAHAM-TALENT REPORT, supra note 35, at 9 ("[T]he materials and equipment needed to produce biowarfare

agents also have legitimate uses inscientific research and commercial industry ....
").
87.
James M. Acton, The Problem with Nuclear Mind Reading, 51 SURVIVAL, Feb.Mar. 2009, at 119, 121.
88.
On the illustrative problem of uranium centrifuge technology for inspections regimes, see Houston G.Wood et al., The Gas Centrifuge and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,
PHYsICs TODAY, Sept. 2008, at 40.
89.
See GRAHAM-TALENT REPORT, supra note 35, at 45.
90.
See WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 67, at 5.
91.
See id. at 16.
92.
Id. at 4-5; Carter, supra note 84, at 83.
93.
GRAHAM-TALENT REPORT, supra note 35, at 35.
94.
See BOBBITT, supra note 58, at ii ("[lt is now possible for states and terror groups
to arm themselves with WMD in a small fraction of the time it has hitherto taken.").
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chemical weapons." 95 As detection efforts are effective in one case, states
adapt to confound them.96 Moreover, actors sometimes have incentives to
exaggerate the state of their WMD programs.97
For all of these reasons, WMD capability intelligence will likely remain as it is now: highly murky and uncertain. As a result, in future
crises we cannot confidently expect moments like during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai
Stevenson presented "incontrovertible" photographic evidence of Soviet
missiles being assembled in Cuban territory to both the U.N. Security
Council and a live television audience. Instead, we can expect moments
more like Secretary of State Colin Powell's globally broadcast presentation before the U.N. Security Council forty years later, in which he
painted a picture of Iraq's likely WMD programs with a series of circumstantial pieces of evidence that together indicated likelihood, but far
from certainty, of Saddam Hussein's WMD arsenal. 99
As mentioned earlier, this issue of "capability uncertainty" is a relatively new challenge for anticipatory or precautionary self-defense
doctrine, because in an era of conventional warfare among states, an adversary's first strike capability could usually be assumed or assessed
with high confidence. True, the history of modem conventional warfare
is also replete with examples of intelligence gaps concerning adversary
capabilities and resulting strategic surprises. 0 For example, take Germany's unexpected ability to drive through the Ardennes forest against
France in 1940, bypassing the Maginot line and defying France's entire

95.
WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 67, at 46; see also POSNER, supra note 79,
at 34 (noting that the mere existence of intelligence forces enemies to conceal their intentions
and capabilities, which causes the enemy to suffer costs and delays).
96.
See Betts, supra note 62, at 23 (arguing that since Iran has long been on notice that

it is in the "crosshairs of American military planners," it would be surprising if Iranian strategists "have failed to disperse and conceal important facilities in the interests of frustrating U.S.
intelligence collection").
97.
See WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 67, at 251 (noting that mere procurement activities should not be equated with actual technical capabilities); Jervis, supra note 79,
at 43 (arguing that some countries have an incentive to lie about their capabilities to posture

that they have a deterrent).
98.
See Adla Stevenson, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., United Nations Security Council Address on Soviet Missiles in Cuba (Oct. 25, 1962), available at http://
www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/adlaistevensonunitednationscuba.htmi (last visited Oct.
5, 2009).
99.
Colin Powell, U.S. Sec'y of State, Presentation to the U.N. Security Council on the
U.S. Case Against Iraq (Feb. 6, 2003), available at http://www.cnn.com/2003fUS/02/05/
sprj.irq.powell.transcript (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
100.
See Richard K. Betts, Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence FailuresAre
Inevitable, 31 WORLD POL. 61 (1978); Richard K. Betts, Conventional Deterrence: Predictive
Uncertaintyand Policy Confidence, 37 WORLD POL. 153 (1985).
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pre-war defensive assumptions.0 1 But contemporary WMD capability
uncertainty greatly complicates strategic planning and induces insecurity
not only because of the magnitude of doubt-what is the probability that
a state has or is about to have WMD?-but also because that state's
crossing the WMD threshold has the potential to alter so radically the
balance of power.
The central epistemic challenge at the heart of this paper is well
summarized by Michael Reisman and Andrea Armstrong:
The evolution of weapons systems that are ever more rapid and
destructive and that may be initiated without warning or with
very narrow warning windows has been invoked as a justification for preemption. But ultimately the central issue is
assessment by the risk-averse security specialists of one international actor of the intentions of another actor who has or may
acquire the weapons. In an international system marked by radically different cultures, values, and, as a consequence, factual
perceptions and their strategic assessments, an act of preemptive
self-defense, based upon one actor's self-perceived good faith
conviction, will often look like serious or hysterical misjudgment to some actors and like either cynical or self-deluded,
naked aggression to others.' 2

II. THREE

APPROACHES

A key role for international law is regulating uses of force in ways
that both constrain it appropriately and narrow the gap between what
Reisman and Armstrong characterize as good faith convictions and hysterical misjudgments.' 3 That is, law should guide decisionmaking and
help improve the informational conditions that underlie it. Or, put another way, law should improve accuracy of decisionmaking by
permitting force when its use would be beneficial, and by helping to restrain it when it would not. Further, it should enhance the legitimacy of
certain decisionmaking, by channeling opinions of key actors in the international system according to general norms.
101.
See ERNEST R. MAY, STRANGE VICTORY: HITLER'S CONQUEST OF FRANCE 347-61
(2001) (explaining that German victory resulted from superior imaginativeness in planning).
102.
W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of
Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 525, 526 (2006).
103.
See DOYLE, supra note 20, at 26-28; RICHARD N. HAASS, WAR OF NECESSITY, WAR
OF CHOICE: A MEMOIR OF Two IRAQ WARS 222 (2009); Thomas M. Franck, The Power of
Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: InternationalLaw in an Age of Power Disequilibrium, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 88, 101-05 (2006).
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A. WMD and the Use of Force Debate
Approaches to this problem of precautionary force and emergent
WMD threats generally fall into three categories that I label the traditional view, the unilateralist view, and the reasonable necessity view.
Each is rooted in different assumptions about international relations and
the impact of WMD proliferation.
1. The Traditional View
The traditional view holds that the threat of WMD strengthens the
need to interpret anticipatory self-defense requirements narrowly. It retains a strict imminence requirement for anticipatory self-defense and
directs discretion about other uses of force, absent an armed attack, to
the U.N. Security Council as sole arbiter of legality. The 2004 Report of
the U.N. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change--a report endorsed by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan--emphasized that
"according to long established international law, [a state] can take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means
would deflect it and the action is proportionate."' 5 "The problem arises,"
it acknowledged, "where the threat in question is not imminent but still
claimed to be real: for example the acquisition, with allegedly hostile
intent, of nuclear weapons-making capability"10' But the Panel's solution
was not to expand the scope of self-defense; instead it was to rely on the
U.N. Security Council as the judge of threats to peace and security and
to fashion appropriate remedies.'0 7
Compared to those holding alternative views, adherents to this view
weight the harms of false positives (uses of force in self-defense that
were not actually necessary) relatively high. They emphasize, for example, that WMD proliferation raises the danger of too lenient a standard
for use of force in anticipatory self-defensive, because it may spur states
to pursue WMD as deterrents.' 0 Of particular concern to advocates of
the traditional view is the risk of "pretextual" false positives, or states
representing that a use of force is justified by legitimate considerations,
when in fact it is rooted in impermissible motivations. 0 9
104.
U.N. High-Level Panel, supra note 59, at vii-x.
105.
Id. 188.
106.
Id.
107.
See id. 190.
108.
See Jack I. Garvey, A New Architecturefor the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons, 12 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 339, 345 (2007); Reisman & Armstrong, supra note 102,
at 549 (noting, without rejecting, that preemptive self-defense doctrine has been used to justify

North Korea's nuclear weapons program).
109.
See Franck, supra note 103, at 95-96; Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to
Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 537, 557
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This view is rooted in institutionalist or liberal-institutionalist international relations theory"0 and dominates European international legal
thought."' The traditional view generally assumes a model of state behavior that is highly responsive to multilateral process, international
organizations, and legal norms; and that view offers great hope for stability through international cooperation and consensus-building."' The
traditional view also generally reflects skepticisms of military force and
intervention, and3 a predisposition toward non-forceful methods of conflict resolution. 1
Accordingly, holders of this view also have high confidence in the
capacity of the U.N. Security Council to resolve crises.'"4 It is worth
quoting at length the U.N. High-Level Panel's answer to its own question
whether "a State [can], without going to the Security Council, claim in
these circumstances the right to act, in anticipatory self-defence, not just

(1999); see also Henkin, supra note 26, at 47 ("States that have used force have sometimes
construed the law so as to justify their actions or have defended against charges of violation by
denying or distorting the facts or mischaracterizing the circumstances").
110.
See Thomas H. Lee, InternationalLaw, InternationalRelations Theory, and Preemptive War: The Vitality of Sovereign Equality Today, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
2004, at 147, 158 ("All [international relations] theorists agree that the security dilemma pertains as a descriptive matter today, but they debate its severity and the prospects for mitigation
through international institutions and norms ....[Some] think it can be substantially reduced
by international institutions; realists are skeptical of even that."). Classic works in this vein
include Robert 0. Keohane, Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold
War, in NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 269 (David A.
Baldwin ed., 1993); Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as International Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1 (Stephen D. Kraser ed.,
1983); Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 30 WORLD POL. 167 (1978).
111.
See EUR. UNION INST. FOR SEC. STUDIES, EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY: A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD (2003) (proposed by Javier Solana and adopted by heads
of state and government at the European Council in Brussels), available at http://
www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/solanae.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2009) [hereinafter EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY]; Milagros Alvarez-Verdugo, Comparing U.S. and E.U. Strategies
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction:Some Legal Consequences, 2005 ANN. SURV. INT'L &
COMP. L. 119.
112.
See EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 111, at 14 ("We are committed to
upholding and developing international law. The fundamental framework for international
relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."); Hanspeter Neuhold,
Law and Force in International Relations-European and American Positions, 64 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 263, 267 (2004) ("Europe attaches more importance than the American
superpower to multilateralism, international organisations and international law, with a firm
belief that the United Nations ought to play a strong role.").
113.
See Neuhold, supra note 112, at 266 ("[T]he two catastrophic world wars which all
European nations lost undermined the confidence in the efficacy of military force. Europeans
therefore prefer comprehensive political settlements which address the root causes of internal
and inter-state conflicts and favour economic and political incentives over military coercion.'").
114.
See, e.g., Allen S. Weiner, The Use of Force and Contemporary Security Threats:
Old Medicinefor New Ills?, 59 STAN. L. REv. 415, 448-90 (2006).
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pre-emptively (against an imminent or proximate threat) but preventively
(against a non-imminent or non-proximate one)":
Those who say "yes" argue that the potential harm from some
threats ... is so great that one simply cannot risk waiting until
they become imminent, and that less harm may be done ... by
acting earlier.
The short answer is that if there are good arguments for preventive military action, with good evidence to support them, they
should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize such
action if it chooses to. If it does not so choose, there will be, by
definition, time to pursue other strategies .... "
To "those impatient with such a response," the Panel report responds:
[T]he answer must be that, in a world full of perceived potential
threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of nonintervention on which it continues to be based is simply too
great for the legality of unilateral preventive action,
as distinct
1 6
from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted.
Professor Thomas Franck offers similar reasoning:
[A] right to act without reference to the Security Council is limited to instances of actual or imminent attack.... Even in the era
of weapons of mass destruction, such a claim to use forceful
measures in preventive self-defense must still be made to the satisfaction of the Security Council .... A state that believes itself
threatened by the long-term hostile intentions of another, before
resorting to preventive action, must demonstrate the actuality of
that threat to the satisfaction of the appropriate international institution. Without some jurying or adjudicative process, the right
of preventive action would otherwise become an unbridled license for all states to practice aggression." 7
In other words, alternatives to the traditional view are likely to generate
too much force in the international system.
2. The Unilateralist View
A second view-the unilateralist view-holds that in a world of proliferating WMD, states have a right of self-defensive force against some
115.
116.
117.

See U.N. High-Level Panel, supra note 59, 1$ 189-90.
Id. 191.
Franck, supra note 103, at 104.
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states that have, or will soon have, WMD capabilities even when no imminent plans to attack are identifiable."8 This view is most famously
reflected in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States.
That document proclaimed that "[t]he greater the threat, the greater is the
risk of inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the
time and place of the enemy's attack."" 9 The label "unilateralist" is not
meant to suggest that force is always used by a single state acting alone;
rather, it is meant to suggest that legal decisionmaking is decentralized
and self-regulated by those states contemplating force.
The unilateralist view jettisons the traditional imminence requirement on the grounds that, in the context of WMD, responsible states
cannot wait until specific and immediate threats materialize.'20 The unilateralist view expands self-defensive latitude against non-imminent
WMD threats because, it is argued, a narrower rule skews risk too much
against false positives; the risk of false negatives (failing to use selfdefensive2 force in the face of potential danger) is too great in the WMD
context.1 '
While commonly associated with the George W. Bush administration, this understanding of the U.S. position has roots long pre-dating his
2000 election 2 2 and has support across partisan lines. 23 As Walter Slocombe observed in 2003, "the current US administration is by no means
the first to espouse the notion that the United States has the right, even
the duty, to act alone if the nation's vital interests are at stake . . . .,24 In
118.
See, e.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr. et al., Preemption and Law in the Twenty-First Century, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 467 (2005); John Yoo, InternationalLaw and the War in Iraq, 97 AM.
J. INT'L L. 563 (2003).
119.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 15.
120.
See, e.g., id. at 15-16.
121.
See Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence
in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 552-53 (2002)
("Mistakes may be made. It is better, however, that the price of those mistakes be paid by
states that so posture themselves than by innocent states asked patiently to await slaughter.");
Interview by Wolf Blitzer with Condoleezza Rice, Nat'l Sec. Advisor to the President, on
CNN Late Edition (Sept. 8, 2002), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/
0209/08/le.00.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2009) ("The problem here is that there will always be
some uncertainty about how quickly [Saddam Hussein] can acquire nuclear weapons. But we
don't [want] the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.").
122.
See Lobel, supra note 109, at 553.
123.
See, e.g., Sen. John Kerry, Presidential Debate in Coral Gables, Florida, 40
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2175, 2188 (Sept. 30, 2004) ("The President always has the right
...[of] preemptive strike ....No president, through all of American history, has ever ceded,
and nor would I, the right to preempt in any way necessary to protect the United States of
America.").
124.
Slocombe, supra note 47, at 119. See generally Marc Trachtenberg, Preventive War
and U.S. Foreign Policy, 16 SECURITY STUD. 1 (2007) (arguing that preventive war thinking
has long played a role in U.S. foreign policy thinking).
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1994, the Clinton administration strongly considered military attacks on
North Korean facilities when "faced with the highly dangerous prospect
that North Korea could, within months, have five or six nuclear bombs
and an active weapons program."' 25 Nevertheless, the unilateralist view
gained wide attention during the Bush years
because its senior officials
6
openly.1
and
forcefully
so
it
emphasized
Whereas the traditional view is rooted in liberal-institutionalist international relations theory, the unilateralist view is rooted in realist
thinking, with its emphasis on individual states as the key unit of analysis, making security decisions based on self-centered calculations of
relative power in a largely anarchic international system.' 27 Just as the
traditional view tends to reflect a suspicion of military action, the unilateralist view carries a converse skepticism of international law and
organizations. This perspective has drawn new strength and scholarly
support from contemporary military interventionist thinking, characterized by strong beliefs
about the efficacy of force to combat proliferation
28
and other threats.'
3. The Reasonable Necessity View
A third and final approach-which I favor-is the "reasonable necessity" approach to regulating the use of force against WMD threats.
While embracing multilateral-process solutions when possible, this
125.

ASHTON

B.

CARTER & WILLIAM J. PERRY, PREVENTIVE DEFENSE:

A

NEW SECU-

RITY STRATEGY FOR AMERICA 128 (1999); see also William J. Perry, Proliferation on the
Peninsula: Five North Korean Nuclear Crises, 607 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.,
Sept. 2006, at 78 (advocating a sustained effort to prevent North Korea from building a nuclear arsenal); Elaine Monaghan, Clinton Planned Attack on Korean Nuclear Reactors, TIMES
(London), Dec. 16, 2002, at 12 (quoting Clinton as saying of the North Korean nuclear crisis
in the 1990s: "We actually drew up plans to attack North Korea and to destroy their reactors
and we told them we would attack unless they ended their nuclear programme.").
126.
See DOYLE, supra note 20, at 27.
127.
See Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan InstitutionalProposal, 18 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 1, 3 (Mar. 2004) ("Realists hold that
...[leaders] may employ force, including preemptively, if they deem it necessary for the
pursuit of state interests."); Lee, supra note 110, at 159 ("[W]hat we call the 'laws of war,' a
realist might say, simply reflects principles consistent with rational state action under the security dilemma. Any preemptive war based on a subjectively reasonable perception of threat is a
lawful war."). See generally KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
(1979) (offering a "neorealist" account of international relations, marked by states as unitary
actors pursuing self-interest and relative power).
128.
See, e.g., JOHN BOLTON, SURRENDER IS NOT AN OPTION 430-37 (2007); Eliot
Cohen, A Revolution in Warfare, 75 FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 37, 45; see also Alvarez-Verdugo, supra note 111, at 125-27 (describing emphasis on unilateral military measures
as an element of recent U.S. counter-proliferation strategy); Charles Krauthammer, Irving
Kristol Lecture at the American Enterprise Institute Annual Dinner: Democratic Realism (Feb.
10, 2004), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040227_book755text.pdf (last visited
Oct. 5, 2009).
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school favors objective standards
for judging resort to force outside the
29
system.
Council
Security
U.N.
While the use of force would remain justified when the conditions of
customary anticipatory self-defense are met, this school seeks to build
upon the logic underlying that doctrine. It seeks to adapt use of force
rules to the unique challenges of WMD threats and proliferation, while
maintaining fidelity to the imminence requirement's core purposes of
constraining the use of force except when other options have been exhausted and when waiting poses an unacceptable risk of losing the
opportunity to eradicate the threat-all of this judged by objective standards of reasonableness.'3 ° Whereas some adherents to the unilateralist
school seek to overturn the U.N. Charter system, reasonable necessity
proponents generally seek to preserve it, by articulating standards to
guide U.N. Security Council deliberations, assertions of self-defense (as
protected by Article 51), or exceptions to Article 2(4)'s prohibition on
the use of force."'
This school draws on a combination of realist and liberal theory. Like
realism (and unilateralism), it acknowledges the limits of international
norms and institutions to address threats and constrain self-defensive actions. By analyzing the issue through the perspective of a responsible
threatened state, the reasonable necessity approach acknowledges thatwhere the two conflict-a state's threat perceptions will likely have more
decisional weight than international norms or how the threat fits within a
set of general legal principles. The reasonable necessity approach attempts
to minimize this conflict by bringing the law and the state's situation more
12
closely in line, making use-of-force regulation more context-sensitive.
At the same time, like liberal-institutional theory (and the traditionalists),
it affirms the potential role of law in guiding state behavior and places a
premium on legitimacy in decisionmaking and uses of force.'33
Although they share these theoretical foundations and orientations,
the different ways of assessing reasonable necessity can reflect various
combinations of competing assumptions, policy priorities and ideological principles. These different positions within the reasonable necessity
school are bound by a common sense that developments in the international system-particularly
the proliferation of WMD-have
129.
Within this school is a sub-debate: whether reasonable necessity should be applied
to authorize force in advance of intervention (justification) versus to excuse force after an
intervention (mitigation). This paper does not treat in detail this sub-debate. See GEORGE P.
FLETCHER & JENS DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY: WHEN FORCE IS JUSTIFIED AND

WHY 107-28 (2008).
130.
See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 45, at 213-26.
131.
See infra notes 136-141 and accompanying text.
132.
See sources cited supra notes 127-128.
133.
See sources cited supra notes 110-112.
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undermined the usefulness of the restrictive system contemplated by the
traditional view, but that the unilateralist view is an unacceptable alternative. Further, reasonable necessity proponents share a belief that a
superior system of force regulation can be developed by reference to objective indicators linked to policy objectives (accuracy, legitimacy, etc.),
and the presence of which would justify a reasonable state's resort to
force in a particular circumstance. Their substantive differences on questions such as the relative weight to give false positives and false
negatives are reflected in the specific factors they identify and how they
locate the authority to apply the analysis.' 34
Abraham Sofaer, for example, offers a relatively realist scheme, proposing four factors for use in establishing the reasonableness of using
force in a given circumstance: the magnitude of the threat, its probability
of occurring, the exhaustion of peaceful alternatives, and consistency
with the underlying purposes of the U.N. Charter.'35 All of these factors
are selected for their capacity to "establish[]the legitimacy of using force
under international law principles and U.N. Charter values.' 36 Sofaer
envisions these criteria as a framework on which individual states could
rely to establish the legality of a precautionary use of force, especially in
the face of WMD threats.
Closer to the liberal end of the reasonable necessity spectrum are the
conditions for the use of precautionary self-defense against states advocated by the Princeton Project on National Security.' 37 These include
exhaustion, "overwhelming confidence" in the action's foundational intelligence and operational prospects, preparedness for the aftermath, and
the clear endorsement of the U.N. Security Council or "another broadly
representative multilateral body."'' 38 This approach's principal distinguishing characteristics include the high epistemic standard it sets for
intelligence and the requirement of actual multilateral authorization,
which precludes unilateral application but allows for some action outside
the U.N. Security Council system. Although both characteristics have
qualitative analogues in the Sofaer framework, the Princeton Project sets
higher and clearer thresholds for each, reflecting relatively greater concern for false positives and appreciation of the importance of multilateral
process.139
134.
See, e.g., DOYLE, supra note 20, at 96 ("Imperfect and incomplete as they are, the
right decisions about prevention in the world we now live in will rest with democratic publics
who understand that their acts will set precedents that others will follow.").
135.
See Sofaer, supra note 45, at 220.
136.
Id.
137.
PRINCETON PROJECT ON NAT'L SEC., FORGING A WORLD OF LIBERTY UNDER LAW:
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2006) [hereinafter PRINCETON PROJECT].
138.
Id. at 32.
139.
See id.
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Falling somewhere between these two approaches is that of Michael
Doyle, who proposes evaluating military action against non-imminent
threats along four alliterative dimensions: the lethality of the threat, the
likelihood of its materialization, the legitimacy of the proposed action
(determined by reference to traditional just war principles), and the legality of the target state's domestic and international behavior and the
threatened state's response.' 40 Instead of requiring multilateral authorization or treating all U.N. Security Council actions as an input into a
determination of reasonableness-as do the Princeton Project and Sofaer, respectively-for Doyle the U.N. Security Council would remain
the preferred but non-exclusive means of response. To this end, he requires exhaustion of U.N. Security Council remedies prior to unilateral
application,
as well as national and international reporting of the legal
4
analysis.
When used to evaluate individual cases, a reasonable necessity approach's conclusions are shaped not just by the selection of criteria, but
also by how the criteria are applied to specific facts of a case. To illustrate, compare Sofaer's and Doyle's separate analyses of the 2003 Iraq
War. Sofaer found a persuasive legal case for invasion, 142 while Doyle
found the intervention "illegitimate, radically disproportionate, and unjustifiable.' 43 Under Doyle's approach, the case for war foundered
largely on the basis of a criterion his scheme shares with Sofaer's: "likelihood."' The question of capability is embedded in this factor and each
approach to likelihood addressed this element with a different manner
and intensity. Doyle's treatment of likelihood focused heavily on the
evidentiary strength of the claims that Saddam Hussein was developing
or retained a WMD capability-the very capability uncertainty issue at
the heart of this paper. 45 Sofaer, on the other hand, devoted more attention to the regime's behavioral history and indications of its propensity
to employ WMD.' 6
See DOYLE, supra note 20, at 46.
See id. at 60-62.
Sofaer, supra note 45, at 224.
143.
DOYLE, supra note 20, at 90-91.
144.
See id. 90-92; Sofaer, supra note 45, at 221-23.
DOYLE, supra note 20, at 90-92; see also Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands
145.
of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 599, 604 (2003) ("[T]he danger should be
imminent in that it can be identified credibly, specifically, and with a high degree of certainty.").
146.
Sofaer, supra note 45, at 221-23. In addition to evaluating how each of the three
schools deals with the peradventure surrounding this "likelihood" component, the remainder
of this paper elucidates critical subsidiary issues involved in a substantive legal analysis of
capabilities under uncertainty. This clarification is especially relevant to reasonable necessity
systems like Doyle's and Sofaer's, and should help ensure that different conclusions reflect
different policy choices rather than confusion.

140.
141.
142.
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While advocating different criteria, all of these reasonable necessity
examples share a concern that U.N. Security Council monopoly authority over the use of force risks under-protecting states from contemporary
threats.147 They also share a belief that widely accepted standards can
help fill that gap in protection without damaging international legal
norms prohibiting armed aggression-and that in the long term, these
standards will strengthen these norms.
B. Three Approaches to Capability Uncertainty
While the stakes may be uniquely high in contemplating force
against WMD threats, the problem of accurately assessing a factual
premise key to adjudicating legal authority is a very common one. Three
approaches to judging disputed issues of fact critical to a legal appraisal
are widespread in the law, and they correspond to the three major
schools of precautionary self-defense: the 4use of subjective standards,
objective standards, and a process approach.
Doctrinal Test

Approach to Capability
Uncertainty

Traditional View

Absent imminent threat, force
allowed only with U.N. Security
Council authorization
Unilateralist View
Force allowed ifgood faith
belief inWMD threat
Reasonable Necessity View Force allowed if reasonable
state would conclude that force
isnecessary

Process

Subjective standard
Objective standard

The following Sections examine and evaluate how each school of
precautionary self-defense attempts to manage problems of WMD capability uncertainty. All three schools promise to calibrate effectively the
appropriate level of force in the international system (allowing enough
force to deal effectively with genuine threats but not so much as to pose
threats to peace and stability), and to do so in a manner consistent with a
147.
See, e.g., DOYLE, supra note 20, at 33 ("[The Security Council] has in numerous
instances in the past behaved irresponsibly-failed to authorize the use of force when it was
arguably justified .... ); PRINCETON PROJECT, supra note 137, at 23 ("The United Nations is
failing to live up to its potential, though. Security Council resolutions are often unenforced or
under-enforced.").
148.
Consider, as an example, possible legal approaches to determining a police officer's
authority to search a home for criminal activity: one based on the officer's state of mind and
purposes (subjective standards); one based on guidelines for a reasonable officer in that position (objective standards); or one based on obtaining authorization from a magistrate
(process).
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normative vision of authoritative legal rules. This Part therefore considers each approach especially against these common objectives, which I
respectively label "accuracy" and "legitimacy."
1. The Traditional View: A Process Approach
The traditional view relies heavily on a process approach for judging
threats, including their factual premises such as state capability. 4 9 Under
the traditional view, the U.N. Security Council is the multilateral body
charged with making the capability assessments incident to determining
the existence of a "threat to international peace and security" sufficient
to justify the use of military force.' 50 These capability assessments are in
turn informed by a number of auxiliary multilateral processes, both from
within the U.N. system and from interlocking and overlapping treaties
and multilateral organizations. For example, in the course of verifying its
safeguards and the obligations imposed by treaties such as the NonProliferation Treaty and the Additional Protocol, the Board of Governors
of the International Atomic Energy Agency reports any determinations of
non-compliance to the U.N. Security Council, which can then take a
range of actions including mandating further actions by the IAEA.'' Ostensibly, these auxiliary processes will assist the U.N. Security Council
in determining whether a state poses a threat sufficient to warrant authorization of precautionary force.
a. Advantages
Some argue that these multilateral processes have deliberative advantages that increase accuracy by reducing the risks of error inherent in
unilateral assessments of proliferators' capabilities. As Allen Weiner posits,
[w]ith respect to erroneous assessments, the requirements of Security Council deliberations and approval regarding the use of
force to address a particular threat are likely to produce a betterinformed decision, since all Security Council states, and not just
the state that perceives itself to be threatened, will contribute to
the assessment of the threat based on data in their possession.
149.
See Franck, supra note 103, at 102 ("The problem, then, does not lie with formulating a norm. It lies with the process for implementing it: who, or what institution, what judge
or jury, should decide whether the norm's requisites for preemptive action have been met.");
id. at 105 ("The basic procedural notion of the Charter is that every nation, before taking military action, except in self-defense against an imminent or actual armed attack, must first
demonstrate to its peers that ... there exists an actual threat to the peace.").
150.
U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42.
151.
Statute of the Int'l Atomic Energy Agency art. XH.C, Oct. 23, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093,
276 U.N.T.S. 3.
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The procedural requirements of collective deliberation and information sharing among Council members thus can serve to
"correct false beliefs.' 52
Under this view, U.N. Security Council deliberation will facilitate information exchanges that improve capability appraisals and temper
states' tendencies to "worst-case" their estimations-both worthy aims.
Others emphasize the importance of legitimacy in reaching joint,
common assessments of threats through multilateral processes.'53 In
discussing empowerment of the U.N. Security Council with a permanent
inspectorate and other capability-assessment mechanisms, Jessica
Tuchman Matthews explains that "[t]he effort is worth taking because no
other entity, existing or imagined, commands the Security Council's
universal legitimacy ...,,"4
This legitimacy can be instrumental to the success of auxiliary processes that reduce capability uncertainty. The multilateral structure and
involvement of the United Nations in inspection systems such as the
IAEA and UNMOVIC155 increase the diplomatic pressures that can produce greater state compliance, facilitating the investigations that yielded

152.

Weiner, supra note 114, at 428.
See IAN HURD, AFTER ANARCHY: LEGITIMACY AND POWER IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (2007); Jutta Brunn6e, The Security Council and Self-Defence:
Which Way to Global Security?, in THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE USE OF FORCE: THEORY

153.

AND REALITY-A NEED FOR CHANGE?

107, 112 (Niels Blokker & Nico Schrijver eds., 2005)

("[T]he Security Council has maintained a unique ability to lend legitimacy to international
action, including the use of force."). Especially in the developing world, however, the Security
Council's legitimacy has come under increasing challenge. See Press Release, Gen. Assembly,
When Force Is Considered, There Is No Substitute for Legitimacy Provided by United Nations, Secretary General Says in General Assembly Address, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/8378 (Sept.
12, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SGSM8378.doc.htm (last
visited Oct. 5, 2009) ("[W]hen States decide to use force to deal with broader threats to international peace and security, there is no substitute for the unique legitimacy provided by the
United Nations."); see also The Secretary-General, Strengthening of the United Nations: An
Agenda for Further Change, [20, U.N. Doc. A/57/387 (Sept. 9, 2002), available at http://
www.un.org/events/action2/A.57.0387.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2009) ("In the eyes of much of
the world, the size and composition of the Security Council appear insufficiently representative. The perceived shortcomings in the Council's credibility contribute to a slow but steady
erosion of its authority, which in turn has grave implications for international peace and security:"); Bardo Fassbender, Pressure for Security Council Reform, in THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY

341, 347-48 (David M. Malone ed.,

2004) (noting that developing states feel that they are "grossly under-represented" on the Security Council, although there is little unanimity between the developing states as to what a
better system would look like).
154.
Jessica Tuchman Matthews, WMD and the United Nations, Keynote Speech to the
International Peace Academy (Mar. 5, 2004).
155.
U.N. Monitoring, Verification, & Inspection Comm'n, http://www.unmovic.org/
(last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
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the most accurate depictions of Iraq's WMD capabilities.'5 6 Even skeptics of the U.N. Security Council's efficacy therefore acknowledge the
practical benefits of its legitimacy. 157
Beyond any legitimacy or deliberative advantages of U.N. Security
Council process in assessing capabilities, there is a broader argument
rooted in the traditional view's understandings of the purposes underlying use of force law and of how international actors operate within it. For
supporters of the traditional view, one danger of capability uncertainty is
that states will attempt to exploit this ambiguity to justify impermissible
uses of force. This sort of concern with states' pretextual use of stan58
dards animates much of the broader traditional view framework.
Always wary of the unilateral application of legal standards, the traditional view worries that states' capability assessments will produce
inflated estimates of the threat, often concocted as pretexts. This reasoning is also consistent with the traditional view's relatively greater
concern with false positives. If false positives are more dangerous than
false negatives and capability uncertainty increases the risk of both, a
sensible approach to the problem of capability uncertainty might focus
on mitigating the heightened problem of false positives through process
checks.
b. Drawbacks
i. Accuracy Concerns
If traditionalists are especially worried about false positives, one
must ask how effectively their approach handles dangers of false negatives.
156.

See

NECESSARY

TREVOR FINDLAY,

AND

FEASIBLE,

A

AN

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

NEWSWEEK,

STANDING UNITED NATIONS WMD VERIFICATION BODY:
INTERIM

STUDY

PREPARED

FOR THE

COMMISSION

ON

(2005); Fareed Zakaria, We Had Good Intel-The UN's,

Feb. 9, 2004, at 39.

157.
See, e.g., Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, 83 FOREIGN
An., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 136, 148 (observing that "[tihe unmatched legitimacy that the UN
lends to Security Council actions makes it easier for member states to carry them out and
harder for the targeted governments to evade them by playing political games").
158.
See Weiner, supra note 114, at 427 ("[T]he pre-Charter regime governing the use of
force, in which states were entitled to use force unilaterally either to vindicate their legal
rights or to counter perceived threats to their security, had shown itself to be susceptible to
erroneous and bad-faith implementation. Because this standards-based approach had led to the
overinclusive and excessive use of force, the Charter's founders were unwilling to delegate
substantial discretion to individual states to act as agents to determine the conditions under
which they might on their own authority use force."); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at
272-75; Antonio Cassese, Return to Westphalia?, Considerationson the GradualErosion of
the Charter System, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 505, 516
(Antonio Cassese ed., 1986) ("[T]he risks of abuse should lead us to interpret [the self-defense
provision in] Art. 51 very strictly and consider it as giving only very exceptional licence.").
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At the outset, consider how the U.N. Charter initially allocated responsibility for assessing threatening capabilities and how this allocation
has shifted. At the time of the Charter's inception, states could discern
imminent threats more easily, particularly because these threats were
often accompanied by a large-scale mobilization of conventional forces
that were often readily observable.' But due to WMD proliferation, developments in missile technology, and the expansion in capability
uncertainty, "the preemptive use of force is often difficult to justify because clear evidence that a threat is imminent is rare." '6° Since the ability
to respond to an imminent threat now offers much more limited protection and U.N. Security Council authorization to use force is the only
other recourse under the traditional view, the U.N. Security Council assumes a proportionally expanded role in making the capability
assessments that can support self-defensive action. The U.N. High-Level
Panel "recognized that it could well be necessary for the Security Council to authorize military action in a case like Iraq .... [T]he trade-off for
expanded substantive jurisdiction is a tighter hold than ever on multilateral process.' 6' This increased responsibility in judging capabilities
exceed what was contemplated when the U.N. Security Council was designed. 1
The U.N. Security Council voting system has a structural inclination
toward underestimating threats and weighing false positives more
strongly than false negatives-a structural feature especially likely to
come into play amid capability uncertainty. At least sixty percent of
62

159.
See Alex J. Bellamy, Pre-Empting Terror, in SECURITY AND THE WAR ON TERROR
104, 114 (Alex J. Bellamy et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the contemporary challenges to traditional self-defense doctrine, noting that "conventional wars are preceded by clear warnings,
most obviously troop mobilisations and deployments... ").This is not to deny the possibility
of achieving tactical or strategic surprise in conventional conflicts. However, instances of
successful surprise in conventional conflicts usually are caused not by an absence of perceptible, objective indicators of an attack, but by the target's subjective errors in discerning and
interpreting these signals. See EPHRAIM KAM, SURPRISE ATTACK: THE VICTIM'S PERSPECTIVE
37 (1988) ("Analysis of surprise attacks suggests that the intelligence community seldom fails
to anticipate them owing to a lack of relevant information. In most cases the victim possesses
an abundance of information indicating the imminence of the attack."). In contrast, WMTD
threats are characterized by a near-complete absence of perceptible, objective indicators of an
imminent attack. See BRUCE G. BLAIR, THE LOGIC OF ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR 171-73
(1993).
160.
See Feinstein & Slaughter, supra note 157, at 147.
161.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of
UN Reform, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 619, 626 (2005).
162.
This is evident from the fact, for example, that arms control inspection regimes
administered through the United Nations long post-date its founding. Article 39 of the U.N.
Charter states: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N. Charter art. 39.
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member states and no vetoes from the five permanent members
(Permanent-5) are required to authorize a military action or threat,
effectively demanding consensus among a diverse group of nations on a
subsidiary set of capability questions, many of which may be shrouded
in uncertainty or ambiguity.6 6 Even leaving aside the possibility of
strategic voting and vetoes, this sets a high bar for a threatened state to
clear, since it must present evidence satisfying the Permanent-5 member
with the highest evidentiary standards.'64
The evidentiary standards used by the most demanding Permanent-5
member to evaluate potentially threatening capabilities may owe their
rigor to considerations unrelated to the goal of accurately discerning the
existence of a threat, such as self-interest or the Permanent-5 member's
relationship with the threatening state.165 In the most extreme cases, a
member of the Permanent-5 may wholly subordinate the issue of appraising capabilities to self-regard, because its perceived national interest
would be inconsistent with an authorization of force.' 6 But policing this
kind of problem is difficult, because it is often impossible to determine
clearly whether a particular outcome is due to legitimate considerations
(for example, good-faith doubts about capability evidence) since the
U.N. Security Council's decisionmaking is essentially without standards
and much of the real
deliberation takes place in private between Perma67
members.
nent-5
All this speaks to several problems with the traditional view's approach to managing capability uncertainty. First, even under ideal
assumptions of independent voting based on collective interests, it is questionable whether the most exacting epistemic standards employed by a
Permanent-5 member represent the appropriate evidentiary threshold for
calibrating the use of force under capability uncertainty, unless the
163.
See U.N. Charter art. 27.
164.
See Acton, supra note 87, at 123-24. For a specific example of this phenomenon in
practice, see Block on Iran Sanctions, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 21, 2006, available at http:/l
www.nytimes.com/2006/04/21/world/europe/21 iht-russia.html?_r=l (last visited Oct. 6,2009).
165.
See Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 35 ("[P]olitical calculations have
caused deadlock at the Security Council, enabling nuclear rogues such as Iran to defy successive, fairly weak UN sanctions resolutions with virtual impunity.").
166.
See Ruth Wedgwood, Unilateral Action in the UN System, 11 EUt. J. INT'L L. 349,
351 (2000).
167.
See Ian Johnstone, Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 437, 453 (2003) ("Distinguishing true reasoning or sincere
communication from strategic argumentation in world politics is a challenge."); id. at 438, 452
(characterizing the Security Council as a venue for "heated, unsystematic" debate that is "often"-but not always-principled, and noting that the Council "does not employ judicial
criteria when it makes decisions" beyond the limitations of the charter). U.N. member states
have recognized this problem as well. See Thalif Deen, Security Council's Secretive Habits
Challenged, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 21, 2006, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/
component/content/article/200/41252.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
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danger of false positives truly dwarfs the danger of false negatives. Second, there exist virtually no standards or procedural safeguards to ensure
or encourage a connection between the assessment processes that U.N.
Security Council members employ and the underlying objective of determining whether sufficient evidence of a threat exists. 68 If just one
member of the Permanent-5 imports considerations that portray doubt
but are not rationally related to this policy goal, the entire process may
be confounded and may risk underestimation. While "[a] procedural system that errs in the direction of underemployment of force is seen by
some as desirable, as if no countervailing danger were created,'" 69 many
others-especially states facing developing WMD threats-have a substantially greater70 concern with false negatives and the danger of
underestimation. 1
In practice, these structural features tend to restrict the range of capability evidence that will be germane to a U.N. Security Council
authorization of force. Since the evidence establishing WMD capabilities
must satisfy the Permanent-5 member with the highest evidentiary
threshold, and since there is no framework in place to guide or coordinate standards across members, the conclusions of multilateral auxiliary
processes (like IAEA reports) will tend to become the de facto and
largely exclusive basis for U.N. Security Council capability assessments. 7' This is because, for one, auxiliary processes like inspections
168.
See DOYLE, supra note 20, at 33 ("[T]he council lacks substantively adequate standards to guide its deliberations concerning when it should authorize preventive force.");
Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 127, at 9 (noting in the context of humanitarian uses of
force that, in the absence of substantive standards, "authorization is likely to be unprincipled"
and inadequately connected to normative goals).
169.
Ruth Wedgwood, The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and
Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 576, 577 (2003).
See BOBBITT, supra note 58, at 452 ("[T]he rule of law is eroding because the pre170.
vailing doctrines of international law are radically insufficient to regulate the efforts of states
that must cope with global, networked terrorism, and with the related threats of weapons of
mass destruction .... ); Abraham D. Sofaer, InternationalSecurity and the Use of Force, in
PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

541, 561 (Russell A. Miller & Rebecca M. Bratspies eds.,

2008) ("[S]elf-defense is a key element in any sensible program to supplement the inadequate,
collective efforts of the Security Council."); see also Dore Gold, Op-Ed, Iran's Nuclear Aspirations Threaten the World, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2009, available at http://www.latimes.com/
news/opinion/la-oe-gold6-2009aug06,0,3778030.story (last visited Oct. 6, 2009) (arguing
from Israel's perspective the need to threaten Iran with force); David E. Sanger, U.S. Says Iran
Could Expedite Nuclear Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2009, at Al (quoting Israeli intelligence
official as saying about U.S. and Israeli assessments about Iran: "We're all looking at the same
set of facts.... We are interpreting them quite differently than the White House does.").
171.
See Acton, supra note 87, at 127, 130 (noting the weight multilateral bodies accord
IAEA assessments and that "inconclusive" forms of evidence can affect Security Council
decisionmaking on the basis of reasons apart from the merits, such as self-interest); id. at 135
("If the case against future non-compliant states is put in terms of proven safeguards violations
...it will probably result in a tougher response."); Ian Johnstone, Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council: Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit, 102 AM. J. INT'L L.
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tend to deal in types of evidence that are less speculative and more
physical and scientific, such as traces of highly-enriched uranium and
technical documentation of weapons programs, an issue discussed below
in Part III. In addition, this evidence's origination or compilation in a
widely endorsed, multilateral process confers to it substantial credibility
and legitimacy,'7 2 such that a disbelieving state may find itself on the
wrong side of overwhelming consensus. Other evidentiary indicators
generally do not enjoy these advantages, and so may be incapable of
generating the consensus necessary to animate a conservative Security
Council. 73
But the traditional view's heavy reliance on auxiliary mechanisms
for assessing capabilities can create counterproductive incentives for
proliferators to confound and otherwise "game" these processes. If questions of state capability must be resolved primarily through these
procedures, frustration of the procedures can enhance the security of
WMD programs by preventing the satisfaction of a legal condition
precedent to the use of countervailing force. This is a critical pitfall of
the process approach, not just because it may lead to undesirable inaction and facilitate WMD development, but because it may increase
capability uncertainty, by incentivizing obfuscation, instead of reducing
it. Part III discusses some ways to address these issues, guided by analysis of objective standards.
Inspections and other investigative techniques used to inform U.N.
Security Council decisionmaking provide abundant opportunities for
their subjects to act strategically and heighten uncertainty. Iraq's approximately thirty-year history with international nonproliferation
processes illustrates these different forms of manipulation and the pitfalls of over-reliance on process.174
275, 296 (2008) (describing the Security Council's reliance on an outside, commissioned
study in deciding proper standards regarding the listing and delisting of targeted individuals
under the provisions of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267).
172.
See generally Nina Srinivasan Rathbun, The Role of Legitimacy in Strengthening
the Nuclear NonproliferationRegime, 13 NONPROLIFERATION REV. 227 (2006) (discussing the
importance of legitimacy in developing and strengthening multilateral non-proliferation institutions).
173.
See Acton, supra note 87, at 129 ("States are likely to decide upon enforcement
actions on the merits of the case, rather than on the basis of self-interest, if the salient factors
are those that can be reliably and accurately assessed by the IAEA.").
174.
See generally David Albright, Masters of Deception, 54 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,
May-June 1998, at 44; Geoffrey Forden, Intention to Deceive: Iraqi Misdirection of UN Inspectors, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REv., Mar. 1 2004, at 30; Khidhir Hamza, Inside Saddam's
Secret Nuclear Program, 54 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 26; Kay, supra
note 63, at 85; Yang Ruifu, Biological Inspections in Iraq: Lessons for BWC Compliance and
Verification, in BEIJING ON BIOHAZARDS: CHINESE EXPERTS ON BIOWEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES 91 (Amy E. Smithson ed., 2007); Wilhelm Unge & Hans Furustig,
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As one pair of scholars put it, "[n]o other state has been so intrusively inspected and thoroughly monitored by the UN."'7 Yet Iraq
employed its ultimate authority over inspectors' physical mobility to its
advantage, creating tactical delays in transportation, disallowing and intimidating disfavored inspectors, and often flagrantly restricting access
to facilities.'7 6 Even when inspectors were able to penetrate some of this
deception and uncover sensitive materials, they often were unable to
avoid alerting the Iraqi regime or prevent the ensuing large-scale destruction of evidence.'1 Perhaps more troubling in terms of the capability
uncertainty problem were Iraq's active deceptions, frequently in the form
of interminable half-truths and strategic disclosure. 7 8 As its last exercise
in manipulating uncertainty, Iraq worried in late 2002 that the indeterminacy of U.N. processes no longer provided an effective check on
individual states and unsuccessfully attempted to create uncertainty by
promising unrestricted access to U.N. inspectors. 79
Future efforts to discern capabilities through these processes are
likely to confront a similarly well-practiced response. In the case of Iran,
for example, in recent years "[t]he Iranians knew that as long as they
could keep playing three-card monte with the inspectors, they could
profit from the ambiguities about their program."'' 80 North Korea has also
been exploiting capability uncertainty to confound inspection processes
over the past two decades''
Unravelling Strategies of Deception and Perceptionin the Iraq Crisis, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE
REV., May 1, 2006, at 43.
175.
Unge & Furustig, supra note 174, at 43.
176.
See, e.g., David A. Kay, Former Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Strategy Regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, Testimony Before
the Senate Armed Services Committee 108th Cong. (Jan. 28, 2004), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2004[US/01/28/kay.transcript/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2009); Paul Lewis,
Iraqis Fire to Bar UN Inspectors; 'We Can't Allow This,' Bush Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
1991, atAl.
177.
See Albright, supra note 174, at 46.
178.
These forms of deception assumed increased importance in the period after the Gulf
War, when singular conditions led to an inspections regime that reduced the sovereign control
retained by Iraq to historically unprecedented levels. See Jonathan B. Tucker, Monitoring and
Verification in a Non-Cooperative Environment: Lessons from the U.N. Experience in Iraq,
NONPROLIFERATION REV.,

Spring-Summer 1996, at 1, 2, 6. Examples include the post-1991

Gulf War investigations into Iraq's centrifuge program, during which "Iraq told only part of
the story and cleverly hid some key information within otherwise truthful revelations" and
crafted disclosures to create a false perception of its actual suppliers of crucial technical assistance. See Albright, supra note 174, at 49-50.

179.

A VIEW OF OPERATION IRAQI
93 (2006), availableat http://www.jfcom.mil/

KEVIN WOODS ET AL., IRAQI PERSPECTIVES PROJECT:

FREEDOM FROM SADDAM'S SENIOR LEADERSHIP

newslink/storyarchive/2006/ipp.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).

180.

DAVID

E.

SANGER, THE INHERITANCE: THE WORLD OBAMA CONFRONTS AND THE

AMERICAN POWER 90-91 (2009); see also Jahn, supra note 80 (discussing
recent inspection stonewalling by both Syria and Iran).
181.
See SANGER, supra note 180, at 315-35, 339-42.
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It is telling that after persistent deployment of sophisticated and intrusive fact-finding missions, the status of Iraq's WMD capabilities
remained so uncertain that many of the world's sophisticated intelligence
services had formed grossly inaccurate judgments." 2 Besides casting
doubt on the unilateralist approach, this history and eventual outcome
should also caution against future over-reliance on fact-finding processes
of the type especially likely to be relied upon under the traditional view.
As David Kay, former chief U.N. weapons inspector, writes,
[a] deception campaign that results in bureaucratic paralysis
through uncertainty or disagreements as to capabilities and intentions will often be sufficient to obtain a state's objective-it
will not need to reach the higher "gold" standard of widespread
belief in the deception.183
This suggests that improvements in inspection processes and counterdeception may be of limited value or may create a false sense of security184
ii. Legitimacy Concerns
When its supporters argue that U.N. Security Council assessments of
capabilities carry greater legitimacy,'85 they often use the term "legitimacy" as "a function of the perception of those in the community
concerned that the rule ... has come into being ... in accordance with
right process."'8 16 But this approach to capability assessment fails to gar-

ner legitimacy in another sense: "the capacity of an international legal
rule to187pull those to whom it is addressed toward consensual compliance."'
The principal source of this legitimacy deficiency is the divergence
between how threatened states and the U.N. Security Council assess
threats under capability uncertainty, which in turn is rooted in the different interests of threatened states and adherents to the traditional view in
182.

Kay, supra note 176; Kenneth M. Pollack, Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went

Wrong, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 78.
183.
Kay, supra note 63, at 101.
See Hans Blix, Developing International Law and Inducing Compliance, 41
184.
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 12 (2002) ("When cooperation with inspectors is limited ....
[s]uch inspection may risk lulling neighbors and the world into a false confidence .... Cos-

metic inspection may be worse than none.").
185.
See supra notes 153-157 and accompanying text.
186.
Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L. L.
705, 711 (1988); see also ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 118, 127 (1995).
187.
Franck, supra note 103, at 93 (citing his earlier work, THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE
POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990)).
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considering assessments. If a state strongly believes it faces an actual
WMD threat and has formed this belief through a reliable evidentiary
assessment, but is unable to obtain the U.N. Security Council's blessing,
its leaders are unlikely to accept inaction as a sacrifice necessary to prevent future false positives and preserve the norm of nonintervention.
Philip Bobbitt identifies this problem when he argues that "[a]t present,
the rule of law is eroding because the prevailing doctrines of international law are radically insufficient to regulate the efforts of states that
must cope with global, networked terrorism, and with the related threats
of weapons of mass destruction, genocide, and overwhelming civilian
catastrophes.' 88
This problem is aggravated by the absence of transparent criteria to
guide the U.N. Security Council's threat assessments. The U.N. HighLevel Panel recognized the legitimacy cost of standardless U.N. Security
Council decisionmaking generally, arguing that, in its use of force
judgments, "the Council should adopt and systematically address a set of
agreed guidelines" to promote "the common perception of their
legitimacy-their being made on solid evidentiary grounds, and for the
right reasons."'89 The argument applies with equal force to the
capabilities component of U.N. Security Council decisions. Crucially,
when the Security Council declines to authorize the use of force against
an asserted WMD threat, it may often be impossible to determine
whether its judgment was based on doubt with respect to capabilities,
intentions, insufficient exhaustion of non-forcible means, or some
combination of concerns, and the underlying reasons for finding a
deficiency in any of these areas may be even less clear. Compliance by
threatened states with a rigid process is even less likely where the
reasons for an adverse decision are ambiguous or suspected of being
rooted in others' self-interests.' 90
Adherents to the traditional view hope that these concerns can be
mitigated through improved procedures and greater political commitment toward their collective use by powerful states. But the recent
practice of states suggests there is a long way to go before states can
place their precautionary security largely in the hands of collective decision-making bodies.

188.

BOBBITT, supra note 58, at 452.
189.
U.N. High-Level Panel,supra note 59, at 66.
190.
See generally Johnstone, supra note 171 (discussing the "deliberative deficit" of
U.N. Security Council decisionmaking, and proposing ways to remedy it).
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2. The Unilateralist View: A Subjective Standards Approach
As an alternative to the traditional view, the unilateralist view relies
on a subjective standard for judging WMD capabilities and threats:19'
Does a state in good faith perceive sufficient threat of WMD attack from
an adversary state? States may rely on their independent judgments
about the capabilities and threats posed by others.
This view accepts uncertainty and ambiguity as an inherent feature
of intelligence.9 2 In its 2006 National Security Strategy, the Bush administration reiterated that the United States would "not rule out the use
of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time
and place of the enemy's attack."' 93 It went on to note that "there will
always be some uncertainty about the status of hidden programs.' 94
Donald Rumsfeld echoed this view in testimony to the Senate Armed
Services Committee, cautioning against "mistak[ing] intelligence for
irrefutable evidence" and bluntly telling the Committee that "intelligence
will never be-perfect," while arguing that demands for unrealistic certainty in intelligence risk curtailing the flow of intelligence to
decisionmakers.' 95
a. Advantages
Under the unilateralist view, threat assessments made by multilateral
bodies like the United Nations carry an unacceptable risk of
underestimation, given the relatively greater weight they assign to false
negatives in the WMD context.' 96 Moreover, in keeping with its roots in
realist and interventionist theory, the unilateralist view considers the
factual
191.
See DOYLE, supra note 20, at 26 ("There is another problem with allowing one state
to adopt a standard that is as subjective and open-ended as the Bush administration's identification of threats."); Rivkin, Jr. et al., supra note 118, at 496 ("[T]he principle of anticipatory
self-defense does not, and has never, required that the threat have been genuine--only that it
be perceived to be so in good faith."); see also BOLTON, supra note 128, at 438 ("Saddam's
regime itself constituted a threat to peace and our security, whether or not imminent, and that
alone was a compelling justification to eliminate it."); Kerry, supra note 123, at 2188 (asserting a unilateral right to determine ifthreats justify force); Lee, supra note 110, at 159 (stating
that, to a realist, "[a]ny preemptive war based on a subjectively reasonable perception of threat
is a lawful war").
Cf Roger D. Carstens, Less than Perfect Intelligence: A Leader Must Decide With192.
out All the Facts, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2003, at A23.
See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES
193.
OF AMERICA 23 (Mar. 2006).

194.
Id. at 24.
195.
Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Defense, Remarks on Intelligence, Remarks before the
Senate Armed Services Committee, Feb. 4, 2004, available at http://www.defenselink.milV
speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=92 (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
See BOLTON, supra note 128.
196.
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appraisal of emerging
threats to be inalienably committed to individual
97
states' discretion.
In response to the criticism that this subjective standard could lead to
overestimation of threatening capabilities and the unconstrained use of
force, proponents of the unilateralist view sometimes point to several
checks inherent in a state's decision to use anticipatory force. For one,
the possibility that undetected weapons could be used in retaliation or
during armed conflicts requires leaders to develop the most accurate intelligence feasible and refrain from using force unless they perceive the
risks of doing so as outweighed by risks of inaction. This is the reasoning embodied in Michael Glennon's stipulation that "[a] reliable
assessment of likely costs is an essential precondition to any preemptive
action. ", 9'
In addition, because the success of a military action may depend
upon domestic and (depending on which unilateralist view advocate you
ask) international support, political pressures may impose higher epistemic standards on a state's capability judgments.'9 In the domestic
realm, Daniel Pipes explains:
I have endorsed preemption, both in the abstract and as applied
to the Iraqi dictator. But in doing so, I am aware of its special
difficulties: error is likely, and uncertainty is inescapable....
These difficulties place special responsibility on a government
that preempts. It must act in as transparent a manner as possible,
without guile. It must first establish the validity of its actions to
its own citizenry. Second, because Americans heed so much
what others think, the opinion of the targeted country's population also matters, as does the opinion of other key countries. 20

197.

See, e.g., Richard Pipes, Defending and Advancing Freedom: A Symposium, 120

COMMENTARY

21, 56 (2005) ("A country's security is not the subject of discussion by others.

The United Nations has no inherent right to decide whether the U.S. is threatened and how it
is to react to the threat. Sovereignty implies both the right and the duty to protect one's citizens?'); Robert Bork, The Limits of InternationalLaw, NAT'L INT., Winter 1989-90, at 3; see
also MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERVENTIONISM
AFTER Kosovo 204 (2001) ("[W]hatever its practical difficulties, states have come to employ
a cost-benefit approach, rather than seek guidance from the scholastic legalist alternative, for
the simple reason that they see it as relying upon reality rather than myth.").
198.
Michael J. Glennon, Preempting Terrorism: The Casefor Anticipatory Self-Defense,
7 WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 28, 2002, at 24.
199.
See Rivkin, Jr. et al., supra note 118, at 491 ("[D]uring the September 2004 presidential debates, Senator John Kerry declared that any American President would use
preemptive strikes, if necessary. The contrast between him and President Bush was over the
circumstances in which preemption could be employed.").
200.
Pipes, supra note 197, at 54.
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While there is greater disagreement among unilateralist view proponents on the relevance of international support to the success of
precautionary use of force, it is generally accepted that any benefits possibly deriving from international support are contingent on the epistemic
strength of the supporting capability assessments.' In analyzing the impact of the intelligence failures of the Iraq War, one staunch defender of
the Bush Administration's preemption doctrine has observed that
"[b]ecause a policy of preemption is so dependent on accurate intelligence, the international community will question the legitimacy of any
future preemptive action by the United States (or any other nation). 2 2
For repeat players like the United States, the lasting costs of false positives are immense, serving as a check on over-estimation.
In sum, the unilateralist view holds that individual states are best positioned to manage the challenges of capability uncertainty and calibrate
the appropriate level of force in this context, as (i) some degree of capability uncertainty inheres in every justifiable use of force, (ii) threatened
states are best qualified to balance the uncertainties because they bear
the risks of both action and inaction, (iii) ceding any authority for capability appraisal to other entities creates an unacceptable risk of false
negatives and impermissibly delegates fundamental state responsibilities,203 and (iv) domestic and international political pressures are
sufficient checks on states' epistemic processes.

201.
See SANGER, supra note 180, at 70-73 (discussing this perspective among Bush
administration officials in the aftermath of Iraq). At a 2005 press conference, President Bush
was asked whether intelligence failures in Iraq undermined the government's ability to deal
with other threats, such as Iran and North Korea. He responded: "[W]here it is going to be
most difficult to make the case is in the public arena. People will say, 'If we're trying to make
the case on Iran, well, the intelligence failed in Iraq; therefore, how can we trust the intelligence on Iran?'" President's News Conference, 41 WKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1885, 1892 (Dec.
19, 2005). Bush continued: "[T]hat case of making--beginning to say to the Iranians, 'There
are consequences for not behaving,' requires people to believe that the Iranian nuclear program is, to a certain extent, ongoing ....[I]t's no question that the credibility of intelligence
is necessary for good diplomacy." Id.
202.
Larry M. Wortzel, Vice President & Dir., The Kathryn & Shelby Cullom Davis Inst.
for Int'l Stud., The Heritage Found., Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee
Regarding Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Mar. 17, 2004, available at http://
armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/openingstatementsandpressreleases/l08thcongress/04-0317wortzel.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
203.
See generally John Bolton, Under Sec'y for Arms Control & Int'l Sec., U.S. Dep't
of State, Address to the 2003 National Lawyers Convention of the Federalist Society (Nov. 13,
2003), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070324_bolton.pdf (last visited Oct. 6,
2009).
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b. Drawbacks2 °4
i. Accuracy Concerns
The unilateralist view's central problem in calibrating the use of
force under capability uncertainty lies in its failure to differentiate reliable and unreliable epistemic approaches to assessing potential threats.
Momentarily leaving aside the prospect of pretextual capability appraisals, the most worrisome type of unreliable approach involves treating
high-impact threats as cause for military action, even when there is little
evidence indicating the threat will be realized or when the available evidence suggests a very low probability of occurrence. An example is the
"one-percent doctrine" ascribed to former Vice President Dick Cheney,
whereby he stated that "[w]ith a low-probability, high-impact event like
this... [i]f there's a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are
helping al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it
as a certainty in terms of our response."' 5
While this type of approach might be most vividly associated with
the Bush administration, there are reasons to believe state decisionmakers generally may be disposed to evaluate threats in this manner. For one,
WMD threats represent some of the greatest security risks to states, and
their "[c]atastrophic consequences lower the threshold at which leaders
must take the unlikely seriously. '2°6 Political science studies suggest that
leaders' willingness to accept a risk in undertaking military action is increased when the decision is framed in terms of potential losses.0 7 And
204.
I do not repeat here the legal arguments made previously, including that the text of
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter could be read to restrict self-defense to cases in which an
"armed attack" has occurred. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. I focus instead
here on the policy rationales behind different doctrinal approaches.
205.
RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA'S PURSUIT
ITS ENEMIES SINCE 9/11, at 61-62 (2006) (quoting then Vice President Dick Cheney).
206.

OF

JONATHAN RENSHON, WHY LEADERS CHOOSE WAR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREVEN-

163 (2006). Former Prime Minister Tony Blair's public statements after the Iraq war are
also telling here. For example:

TION

Here is the crux. It is possible that even with all of this, nothing would have happened. Possible that Saddam would change his ambitions; possible he would
develop the WMD but never use it; possible that the terrorists would never get their
hands on WMD, whether from Iraq or elsewhere. We cannot be certain. Perhaps we
would have found different ways of reducing it .... But do we want to take the
risk? That is the judgement. And my judgement then and now is that the risk of this
new global terrorism and its interaction with states or organisations or individuals
proliferating WMD, is one I simply am not prepared to run.
Prime Minister Tony Blair, Speech on the Threat of Global Terrorism (Mar. 5, 2004), available at http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5461 (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
207.
See Jack S. Levy, An Introduction to Prospect Theory, 13 POL. PSYCHOL. 171, 17172 (1992).
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as one scholar notes in analyzing states' decisions to use anticipatory
force, in the WMD context "[a]ny discussion of preventive war is inherently framed in terms of losses. By the time leaders have decided to
consider preventive action, they have already framed the issue in terms
of something bad that may happen in the future, that is, they are in the
domain of losses."2 °8 More generally, decisionmakers' perceptions of
their primary obligation as the protectors of2 9their nations are likely to
lower their threshold for actionable certainty. 0
It is clearly undesirable for states to predicate high-risk military action on low probabilities or on thin evidence of a threat. Wars are
notoriously fraught with unintended consequences, and military actions
designed to counter dubious threats risk creating more dangers than they
eliminate. Cass Sunstein summarizes the general problem as follows:
In the context of national security, an aggressive response to a 1
percent threat may create a new threat, perhaps higher than 1
percent, of producing its own disaster. A preemptive war, designed to eliminate a small risk of a terrible outcome, might
210
create larger risks of a different but also terrible outcome.
Among these hazardous collateral effects, the risk of a systemic increase in conflict from widespread use of a legally sanctioned
"precautionary principle" is particularly worrisome. 21' Describing this
danger, Doyle writes that "other states will claim an equivalent right to
act on their equivalently arbitrary threat suspicions, which ultimately
would be an invitation to chaos ....Every state will be preempting
every other state's preventive strikes."2 2
Here, the problem is not that the use of a subjective standard always
entails the use of a "one-percent doctrine" approach to threat assessment
and anticipatory military action, but that the standard accepts this approach and places it on equal legal footing with more robust
assessments, rather than creating the countervailing pressure we want
from use of force regulation. Even more worrying to some, "[t]he 'subjectivation' of the standards of legal restraints on the use of force ... is
the first step on a slippery slope. The content of those standards will no
longer be discernible. This loose construction of the right to unilaterally
208.
209.

supra note 206, at 146 (emphasis in original).
See Patrick Hubbard, A Realist Response to Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars, in
RENSHON,

TERVENTION,

TERRORISM,

AND TORTURE:

CONTEMPORARY

CHALLENGES

TO

JUST

IN-

WAR

59, 65 (Steven P. Lee ed., 2007) ("[L]eaders address this risk and uncertainty by
focusing on their concrete, specific obligation to protect their citizens and, in effect, placing
less value on their more general duty to respect the rights of enemy citizens.").
SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 4.
210.
See MIKKEL VEDBY RASMUSSEN, THE RISK SOCIETY AT WAR 91-140 (2006).
211.
DOYLE, supra note 20, at 26.
212.
THEORY
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use force would undermine the very existence of the prohibition... 23
If one purpose of a legal framework in this area is to discourage the use
of irresponsible epistemic processes under uncertainty and reward the
responsible, a system that fails to distinguish first between the reliable
and unreliable will not satisfy this goal.
Moreover, from the perspective of a target state, if another state's
decision to use force is not subject to any external constraints on judgments, then there remains little incentive to consent to the kind of
inspections and disclosures that under another system might lower the
target state's chances of being attacked. Threats of force can complement
inspection regimes and encourage compliance, but threats are more effective if compliance carries an expected security benefit that outweighs
the security cost of inspections. As a result, a subjective standard could
undermine some promising mechanisms for reducing capability uncertainty and the destabilization it produces.
ii. Legitimacy Concerns
The unilateralist view's subjective standard is unlikely to give the
impression that a particular threat assessment or use of force is the product of "right process. '215 Instead, it creates just the opposite impression:
that a state refuses to abide by assessments reached through universally
respected or pre-agreed procedures 2 6 To those adhering to the traditional
view, unilateral assessment and application of precautionary force strips
it of legitimacy:
The problem that the invasion of Iraq has brought to the fore is
not primarily one of defining or reforming a right to anticipatory,
preemptive, or preventive self-defense in the era of WMDs,
daunting as such a project may be. The problem is that, even if
such a commonly acceptable right could be formulated, by treaty
or by practice, it would be wholly illegitimate so long as some
nations insisted
on the right to interpret and apply the new rule
27
unilaterally. 1
As Richard Falk notes, "[t]he doctrine of preemption, as such, is less
troublesome than its unilateral application in circumstances where the
213.
Public Sitting, Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. Pleadings 1, 37 (Feb. 19,
2003) (quoting the Verbatim Record of the Presentation by Michael Bothe on behalf of Iran),
availableat http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/90/5137.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
214.
See Blix, supra note 184, at 9-10; see also BYMAN & WAXMAN, supra note 3, at I I
("When considering a coercer's threat, an adversary looks at costs associated with continued
resistance versus costs associated with complying with the coercer's demands.").
215.
Franck, supra note 186.
216.
Reisman & Armstrong, supra note 102, at 526.
217.
Franck, supra note 103, at 102.
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burden of persuasion as to the imminence and severity of the threat is not
sustained."" 8
The lack of legitimacy associated with unilateral capability assessments carries important practical disadvantages. Most obviously, a use of
force predicated on a perceived-illegitimate assessment is unlikely to
garner the international support that may be important to the success of
the intervention.2 9' This leads some strategists to conclude that "stronger
agreed factual predicates will help generate support for action and
strengthen legitimacy. For many ... anxiety about the preventive use of
force and WMD [is] attributable to the debacle over the Iraq intelligence
...
.,220 This could, in turn, be addressed through more robust international processes: "Strong, ideally international, fact finding could help
address the problem by strengthening both the authority and capabilities
(especially of inspection and analysis) of organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons. 221
These critiques of the unilateralist view naturally strengthen calls for
stronger international legal process. But they also raise the question of
whether objective standards can remedy problems of untethered subjectivity without exclusive reliance on procedural stringency.
3. The Reasonable Necessity View:
An Objective Standards Approach
The reasonable necessity view uses an objective standard for judging
WMD capabilities and threats: Would a reasonably cautious state have
acted in self-defense on the basis of the available evidence and its epistemic strength? 222 In assessing reasonableness, the reasonable necessity
view seeks to identify factors that a reasonable state would consider in
evaluating a potential threat under capability uncertainty.
The reasonable necessity view calibrates the risks of false positives
and false negatives through different channels than the traditional and
unilateralist views. Each of the latter strikes its balance primarily
218.
Richard A. Falk, What Futurefor the UN CharterSystem of War Prevention?, 97
AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 595 (2003).
219.
See Hart & Fedchenko, supra note 80, at 112; Reisman & Armstrong, supra note
102, n.79; Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence: The Achilles Heel of the Bush Doctrine, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, July-Aug. 2003, at 1, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1338
(last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
220.
James B. Steinberg, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Use of Force, in BEYOND
PREEMPTION, supra note 48, at 19, 36 (emphasis omitted).
221.
Id.
222.
See Schmitt, supra note 46, at 113 ("Ultimately, an adequacy assessment will rest
on the international community's determination of whether a reasonable international actor
would have acted in self-defense on the basis of the evidence in question.").
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through the location of decisional authority (in the U.N. Security Council and in individual states, respectively), giving comparatively little
attention to the substance of the internal logic through which those decisional authorities reach judgments. 123 In a reasonable necessity system,
that logic is paramount. Capability assessments guided by objective criteria and evidentiary rules are the core of this approach, and their
particular configuration will be the principal determinant of how the
risks of different errors are balanced. Instead of assigning capability assessments to an entity in the expectation that its incentives and
characteristics will produce judgments that approximate the desired balance of risks, a reasonable necessity regime conducts this balancing
largely through the substantive criteria themselves. This is not to deny
the influence of decisional authority on outcomes, but as a method for
optimizing the balance of risks it is secondary to the substantive criteria
and epistemic analysis those authorities are tasked with applying.
a. Advantages
Taking this approach to managing false positives and false negatives
should help address accuracy concerns by enhancing the transparency of
the balancing determination, allowing for feedback as law evolves to
deal effectively with evolving threats and conditions. Under unilateralist
and traditional approaches, institutional mechanisms mediate between
the desired balance of risks and their actualization, often leaving the
connection between the policy objective and the outcome unclear. The
reasonable necessity approach hones in on the balance itself, aiming to
optimize policy effectiveness in individual cases and over time. As
Myres McDougal and Florentino Feliciano explained in 1961, "reasonableness in particular context does not mean arbitrariness in decision but
in fact its exact opposite, the disciplined ascription of policy import to
varying factors in appraising their operational and functional significance for community goals in given instances of coercion. 224 Part
III
25
below, aims to provide some of that disciplined policy ascription.1
As to legitimacy, the reasonable necessity view holds promise in
both the "right process" and "compliance" senses with which Thomas
Franck uses the term . 226 A reasonable necessity framework encourages
greater consensual compliance through its congruence with the
considerations and epistemic judgments that a reasonable threatened

, See supra notes 149, 191 and accompanying text.
MYERS S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 218 (1961).
225.
See infra Part III.
226.
See supra notes 186-187 and accompanying text.
223.
224.
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woud employ.
. 227This increases the likelihood that global, policystate stat
would
appropriate uses of precautionary self-defense under capability
uncertainty would fit within a legal framework, and so it likely excludes
fewer cases of precautionary self-defense than the traditional view's
approach.2 " The vitality of the law governing precautionary self-defense
is dependent upon the ability of this law to adapt to contemporary
challenges like capability uncertainty in a manner that decisionmakers
and security professionals perceive as sensible.2 2 9 For this task, an
objective standard is promising, because it directly addresses the same
judgments these actors are forced to make and assesses them in
recognizable terms.
At the same time, an appropriately designed reasonable necessity
scheme can produce capability assessments and use of force answers that
appear to result from "right process." A determination is more likely to be
viewed as the product of "right process" if the standard used is oriented
toward the considerations that governments use to evaluate emerging
threats, and if the way in which these considerations are treated broadly
tracks these states' own evaluative processes. 230 Moreover, as discussed
227.
Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and Kosovo, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 16
(2000) ("If a fact-oriented, reasonableness standard led states to explain themselves in terms
of the considerations they actually take into account in making use-of-force decisions, and by
which they are ultimately judged, that would itself be an improvement over their current disregard of the push-button rules. The common-lawyer approach leads decisionmakers to take
seriously a legal issue that is currently considered too artificial to warrant addressing.").
228.
In explaining that provision for national defense as the first imperative of interational law, Michael Reisman argues:
That part of the legal regime that establishes the licit means and modes for the
maintenance by each community of its national defense is necessarily a response to
the common needs and common interests of politically relevant actors in the system. Their felt necessities determine the content of the law and, in its crafting, take
account of a wide range of factors, such as the current and projected technology and
quanta of weapons; their modes of application; geography and geostrategic implications in specific contexts; and, of course, the characteristics, objectives, and capacities
of manifest and latent adversaries. When some of these factors change to the point that
communities can no longer assure their defense within the ambit of inherited law,
those charged with national defense inevitably demand changes in the law.
Reisman, supra note 27, at 82; see also Sofaer, supra note 170, at 549 ("The legal rationale for
concluding that the Security Council has a monopoly on the lawful use of force grows from a
mix of arguments that have thus far won the day in international legal circles, even though
they have no credibility among national security professionals.").
229.
See Sapiro, supra note 145, at 602 ("Today it is more likely to be foolish, if not
suicidal, for a state that believed its fundamental security interests were at risk to wait until the
first attack.... [A] document meant to be universally accepted and to remain relevant must
also be flexible enough to adapt to changed circumstances").
230.
See Sofaer, supra note 227, at 16 ("[I]f the legal principles involved make sense,
government decisions are far more likely to be influenced by them than if the standards purport to impose conduct alien to reality and to their decisionmaking processes.").
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further below, there are a range of opportunities for a reasonable necessity regime to work in tandem with the U.N. Security Council and other
institutional processes, especially in clarifying the legitimate policy priorities that guide objective standards."'
b. Drawbacks
Supporters of the traditional view are quick to object to the reasonable necessity view along the following lines: In practice, the reasonable
necessity view collapses into the unilateralist view, at least when applied
outside of the U.N. Security Council, and so the traditional view remains
the only available framework to stave off the unconstrained use of force
by states.232 For Franck,
[t]he more indeterminate a norm, the more essential the process
by which, in practice, the norm can be made more specific.
Rules that each member of a community is free to interpret for
itself, without fear of definitive contradiction, are truly rules
lacking in determinacy, for they leave each member free to assert
that "the rules are whatever I say they are." They then have no
objective content whatsoever.233
One might be especially concerned about the slide from objective
standards to subjectivity in the area of international self-defense law
because there is no single "reasonable state" akin to the hypothesized
"reasonable person" of many domestic law contexts. Vast disparities in
power, wealth, prestige, interests, and political systems make it
impossible to discern a single, universal standard. Instead the question
becomes: How would a reasonable state in the position of the one
claiming a right to use force act? That is hard to answer without delving
into the complex strategic calculus of individual state decisionmaking.235
Harold Koh argues in response to Michael Doyle that "[Doyle's
proposed] standards are just too easily manipulated by those who want
to use military force. 236 As a result, the unilateral application of objective reasonableness criteria will devolve into the same unreliable
epistemic tendencies that the reasonable necessity view seeks to
231.
232.
233.
234.

See discussion infra Part II.B.4.
See Franck, supra note 103, at 101-05.
Id. at 102.

See SEYOM BROWN, THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL: FORCE AND FOREIGN POLICY IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 113 (2003); FLETCHER & OHLIN, supra note 129, at 173-74.

235.
See generally David Kaye, Adjudicating Self-Defense: Discretion, Perception, and
the Resort to Force in InternationalLaw, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 134 (2005) (discussing
difficulties of judging the reasonableness of state decisionmaking, especially amid crises).
236.
Harold Hongju Koh, Comment, in DOYLE, supra note 20, at 101, 112-13.
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avoid. 2 " Koh concludes that "[i]f we want to create a meaningful default
position against unwarranted
use of force, in these emergency situations,
238

we need bright-line rules.

Michael Bothe similarly argues that whatever the intuitive appeal of a
reasonableness approach to regulating force in theory, in practice it
"open[s] the door to arbitrariness and subjectivity.'239
" As to the counterrisks, "[i]t may be that the risk of violation is higher if the rule is very
restrictive," and "[i]t may well be that the international community, reshaping the opinio iuris, will one day accept some instances of
pre-emptive use of force., 2 4 But, Bothe concludes, the traditional approach "is a much safer approach to the interpretation and development of
the ius ad bellum than loosening any real restraint by boiling it down to a
rule of reason-a self-destructive mechanism for the prohibition of the
use of force."24'
These dangers are quite real, but one limitation of this objection is
its uneven application of assumptions about state compliance with international law. In considering how a reasonable necessity approach would
operate in a real-world situation, the traditional view assumes standards
will be exploited by its users to justify aggression but fails to explain
satisfactorily how the traditional view will fare better in restraining states

237.
[T]he result is that when there is even a scintilla of evidence of a looming threat,
you must assume that it is a high probability; and that even if there is no evidence
of even a 1 percent probability, that is not evidence of the absence of sufficient
provocation to warrant attacking preemptively, and with overwhelming force. When
such a collective mind-set prevails, evidence quickly gives way to hunches, intuitions, or gut instincts, with tragic consequences should those hunches prove
unfounded.
Id. at 108.
238.
Id. at 114; see also Henkin, supra note 26, at 60:
In our decentralized international political system with primitive institutions and
underdeveloped law enforcement machinery, it is important that Charter normswhich go to the heart of international order and implicate war and peace in the nuclear age-be clear, sharp, and comprehensive; as independent as possible of
judgments of degree and of issues of fact; as invulnerable as can be to self-serving
interpretations and to temptations to conceal, distort, or mischaracterize events.
Id.

239.
Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-Emptive Force, 14 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 227, 239 (2003).
240.
Id.
241.
Id.; see also Franck, supra note 103, at 102 ("The more indeterminate a norm, the
more essential the process by which, in practice, the norm can be made more specific. Rules
that each member of a community is free to interpret for itself... have no objective content
whatsoever.").
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that are determined to use force aggressively. 4 2 This problem afflicts the
traditional view or any regulatory scheme that depends on decentralized
international enforcement, even if it includes centralized adjudication. In
the absence of powerful centralized enforcement, any international legal
regime will have to operate under these limitations. It remains unproven
whether inflexible bright-line rules are better suited to the task, 243 especially when critical facts remain subject to debate among key
international actors.
The principal targets of use of force rules are not limited to actors
determined to disregard international law or wedded to faulty capability
assessments. In relation to these actors, each of the three approaches is
likely to fare poorly in constraining uses of force. Use of force rules
should also be geared to those who may be susceptible to their pull and
designed to maximize the scope of their influence. A reasonable necessity approach is superior on that count, because good faith
decisionmakers are likely to respect legal standards they view as rationally related to appropriate policy concerns.2" Or as Reisman puts it:
Until the installation of an effective world constitutive process,
which will remove the need to rely upon unilateral action for the
achievement of key international goals, it will be for the college
of international lawyers to establish criteria for the lawfulness of
the initiation and application of unilateral anticipatory and preemptive defensive actions. Their lodestar will be the legitimacy
of self-defense insofar as it is implemented in accordance with
the venerable policies of necessity, proportionality, and discrimination. But because the context has changed, the legal
arrangements to implement these policies of international law
must change as well. Legal creativity and factual realism in this
area are called for in equally urgent measure, for if the effectiveness and soundness of a future international regime about the
unilateral use of force remain clouded in uncertainty, the insufficiency of the inherited regime, which was designed for a context

242.
As Sofaer points out, "[s]tates prepared to use force in bad faith are undeterred by
restrictive legal rules." Sofaer, supra note 45, at 225.
243.
See Reisman, supra note 27, at 90 ("[T]he potential for abuse here does not derive
from the power of a single state. Rather, it inheres in a legal system that continues to maintain
weak central institutions and accordingly reserves to each state ... to engage in unilateral
action when necessary for its self-defense.").
244.
See Sofaer, supra note 45, at 225 (arguing that "[s]tatesmen acting in good faith to
protect their nations do not take artificial rules seriously:' but instead "they are more likely to
respect standards rationally related to concerns they recognize as appropriate").
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of weapons
that has changed forever, is certain
beyond"and adversaries
241
beyond peradventure.
All this speaks to the larger issue of identifying the channels through
which we can expect international regulation of force to influence realworld outcomes. A further cause for concern is therefore that in practice,
objective standards slide toward unilateral subjectivity because the reasonable necessity approach lacks clear decisional authority: from where
are the reasonableness standards derived and by whom and where are
they applied? Under the traditional view, the U.N. Security Council is
obviously the legal decisional authority; under the unilateralist view, this
role is played by the individual state. What is the legal decisional authority for articulating and applying objective standards under the reasonable
necessity approach?
A major part of the answer is that for objective standards, like much
of international law, articulation, application, and enforcement are decentralized. "International law is still largely a decentralized process, in
which much lawmaking (particularly for the most innovative matters) is
initiated by unilateral claim, whether explicit or behavioral. 246 Legal
claims are then evaluated through expressions of states and, increasingly,
through international organizations and non-governmental actors, including scholars and other opinion shapers. 247 From a legal process
standpoint, Abram Chayes made a similar point in analyzing the Cuban
Missile Crisis when he explained that "the requirement of justification
suffuses the basic process of choice. There is a continuous feedback between the knowledge that the government will be called upon to justify
its action and the kind of action that can be chosen. 24 8 Especially "[i]n
the context of international law relating to the use of military force, law
is best seen as a means of predicting global reactions to a proposed use

245.
246.

Reisman, supra note 27, at 90.
Id. at 82.

247.

See

W. MICHAEL REISMAN &

JAMES

E.

BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION:

PRACTICES, CONTEXTS, AND POLICIES OF COVERT COERCION ABROAD IN INTERNATIONAL AND

17 (1992) ("By law we mean the expectations that politically relevant actors
in a system share concerning what is the correct way of apportioning and using power, of
producing and distributing particular desired values, and of shaping certain events, in particular circumstances."); W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New
Genre in the Study of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS: THE LAW THAT
COUNTS IN WORLD POLITICS 3, 15 (W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard eds., 1988) ("If
law is to be found in significant part in the application of norms to particular cases and controversies, it is plain that such applications in international politics must be sought in a much
wider range of arenas than the highly formalized and structured judicial fora of domestic systems.").
248.
ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE
ROLE OF LAW 103 (1974).
AMERICAN LAW
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of such force."' 9 That is, "when a lawyer says that a proposed course of
action would be unlawful, the lawyer is really saying that in the past,
international society has decided that such an action is wrongful and, in
similar circumstances, will likely do so again." 250 This is not to say that
legality is merely about winning public support, but that it depends heavily on the ability to defend action in terms of generalized principles.2 '
Chayes continues:
Some of the characteristics of law give it special importance for
public justification. Because of the scope and variety of the
audiences addressed, that process must proceed in terms of more
or less universal and generalized criteria. ...Legal principles

also are regarded as quasi-universal or at least generally
accepted. They are thus well adapted to the needs of public
justification. On the other hand, because of the very prominence
of legal standards as criteria for public accounting, failure to
justify on these grounds or an inadequate legal defence may
compromise the justification exercise over-all.252
It is this public accounting that the reasonable necessity standards aim to
improve.

253

4. Process and Objective Standards: Potential Symbiosis of the
Traditional View and Reasonable Necessity View
All of this is not to suggest that objective reasonableness standards
and use of process to manage capability uncertainty are mutually exclusive. Quite the contrary. There are a number of ways in which the two
should be complementary. This Section examines the opportunities for
productive interaction in two respects: an objective reasonableness
framework's relationship with "auxiliary" processes and its relationship
with the U.N. Security Council system.

Murphy, supra note 6, at 704.
Id.
251.
See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 186, at 118-19 ("A crucial element in the process by which international norms operate to control conduct, is that, as a matter of
international practice, questionable action must be explained and justified .... ); see also
Johnstone, supra note 167, at 440-41 (discussing the importance of justification processes in
international relations).
252.
CHAYES, supra note 248, at 103-04; see also CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 186, at
120.
253.
Although not discussed in this paper, the reasonable necessity approach would help
improve similar accounting at the domestic level, with respect to presidential justification of
force to the public and Congress. For a historical analysis of domestic authorizations of force
based on mistaken assessments or factual uncertainty, see Lori Fisler Damrosch, War and
Uncertainty, 114 YALE L.J. 1405 (2005).
249.
250.
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For all their limitations, multilateral inspections regimes should remain an integral part of an overall system for managing and reducing
capability uncertainty. These processes, supplemented by national intelligence, are a key mechanism for acquiring at least one important form
of evidence: forensic. 254 As such, an objective reasonableness system
might benefit from not only preservation, but expansion of inspection
systems and capabilities, such as the creation of a permanent U.N. inspectorate similar to UNMOVIC. Instead of obviating these auxiliary
processes, a reasonable necessity approach should supplement them with
a broader array of evidentiary tools; its objection to the traditional view
is simply directed at over-reliance on exclusive decision-making procedures and a corresponding likely narrow class of evidence. In turn, these
additional tools can serve to reinforce a process regime by partially foreclosing responses that exploit limitations of inspections. For example, as
suggested above and explored in the next Part, legal burden-shifting and
allocation of risks of factual judgment error through evidentiary norms can
reduce the benefits of many forms of process manipulation.256 As a related
point, a credible possibility of future military action (authorized through
objective reasonableness architecture) could encourage disclosure,
decrease the attractiveness of delay strategies, and eliminate the incentive
257
to cultivate uncertainty for strategic purposes.
In a similar fashion, regulating force through objective standards
should not be seen as incompatible with the U.N. Security Council system, and could be complementary. Under almost any objective
reasonableness regime, the U.N. Security Council is likely to remain the
most desirable source of authorization and the uses of force it sanctions
will remain per se or presumptively reasonable. Operating in parallel,
there would be significant potential for reciprocal reinforcement. As
Michael Doyle argues,
[t]he mere fact that unilateral action could be considered legitimate should have a responsibility-inducing effect on the Security
Council. Rather than enjoying a monopoly, the council will now
know that258its actions are subject to the "market" of alternative
judgment.
Exposing the U.N. Security Council to this sort of "healthy competition" would help push its members to deploy their votes and vetoes on the
basis of the persuasiveness of their reasoning, instead of their institutional
254.
255.
256.

See infra, Part ILJ.B.1.
See generally FINDLAY, supra note 156; Matthews, supra note 154.
See supra Part II.B.1; infra Part Ill.B.3.

257.
258.

See id.
DOYLE,

supra note 20, at 62.
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prerogative. 9 This is also the most promising mechanism for inducing
the real, deliberative use of transparent guidelines in the U.N. Security
Council. If faced with a competing assessment that is particular and organized by reference to objective criteria, the Council as a whole, and in
terms of its individual members, would be pressured to clarify the basis
for its decisions and explain why it reached a different conclusion. This
process of bringing the capability judgments of U.N. Security Council
decisions to the surface and forcing a substantive debate about evidentiary standards is an important first step toward improving the way use of
force rules operate under capability uncertainty.2 60
While there are opportunities for symbiosis, the objective standards
versus process approaches to managing factual uncertainty remain analytically and functionally distinct, and combining them carries some
risks. The reasonable necessity view and the traditional view both embrace formal legal procedures but use them for different ends. In
conducting evidentiary assessments pursuant to a reasonable necessity
analysis, for example, there are hazards to employing legal processes
originally designed for other purposes, including over-stressing them or
disincentivizing their use by raising the stakes of their outcomes.
International legal processes generally are designed to function
within a broader regulatory system. IAEA inspection processes serve
purposes within the larger nonproliferation regime, such as informing
the actions of the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly. 261 A
state's willingness to accept, endorse, or participate in these processes is
likely to be at least partially dependent upon that state's acceptance or
approval of the process' functional role-that is, in its acquiescence to
legal consequences that might flow from compliance or noncompliance
with international obligations.262 Put bluntly, if we sign up for this
agreement, what are we getting ourselves into down the road? Attaching
additional weight to these processes by tying them to an exogenous system of force regulation can alter this calculus, making actors more
reluctant to subscribe to a process with such far-reaching potential conSee Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 127, at 20 ("[T]he democratic coalition pro259.
vides an incentive for the permanent members to use the veto more responsibly and for all
members of the Council to realize that they no longer enjoy an absolute monopoly on the
legitimate authorization of preventive use of force.").
260.
The U.N. High-Level Panel recommends a set of substantive criteria to guide U.N.
Security Council decisionmaking, but does not explain how these criteria will be enforced in
practice. On ways to improve the deliberative quality of the U.N. Security Council, see, for
example, Johnstone, supra note 171, at 303-07.
261.
See supra notes 151, 156 and accompanying text; IAEA, The Texts of the Agency's
Agreements with the United Nations (Oct. 30, 1959), available at http://www.iaea.org/
Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc 11 .pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
262.
See Blix, supra note 184, at 9-10 (discussing difficulties in overcoming states'

reluctance to commit legally to weapons inspection regimes).
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sequences. For example, if the results of the inspections process (or even
perceived interference with inspections) may be used to legally authorize
military action, adopting objective necessity standards that draw on those
findings or judgments may discourage strong demands for inspection by
U.N. Security Council members or the consent of possible proliferators
to inspections in the first place-undermining elements crucial to the
success of the inspection regime. 263
Similarly, international legal processes all carry some risk of error,
but the costs of these errors are to some extent circumscribed by the
process' functional role in a larger system. Linking the outcomes of a
process to objective factors and evidentiary questions in a reasonable
necessity system increases the potential cost of errors. Processes with
deficiencies or error-probabilities that may have been undesirable but
acceptable when the consequences of an erroneous output were limited
by their narrow role in a larger framework may be unacceptable when
the consequences include a factual conclusion that leads to the mistaken
authorization (or non-authorization) of force against a state. As a result,
processes that are useful in a limited role may be disfavored or abandoned by states or organizations for fear of the impact of their errors in
an objective necessity analysis.
These types of potential pitfalls are concerns that should shape the
selection of evidentiary factors. Problems of calibrating a legal system's
evidentiary rules to manage risks of error and avoid perverse incentives
are not new and should not deter us. Rather, they reveal the need to analyze more deeply how evidentiary principles could and should operate in
the international legal regime.
III. NEXT STEPS: DEVELOPING EVIDENTIARY NORMS
The analysis above points to the need for reasonable necessity proponents to address epistemic or evidentiary questions. In a world in
which complete clarity or consensus regarding states' WMD capabilities
is impossible, how should states or collective security institutions judge
capabilities? Furthermore, the preceding analysis suggests that even traditional view adherents, unpersuaded by the promise of objective
standards, ought to consider more rigorously and systematically these
evidentiary questions. The objective reasonableness analysis reveals that
evidentiary principles reflect policy choices on such matters as how to
balance competing risks (especially between false positives and false
negatives), how to decide when sovereign equality should yield to extra
263.

This issue is explored in more detail infra Part HI.C.
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suspicion of particular states, and how to best combat WMD proliferation over the long term. Even if one remains unconvinced by the
reasonable necessity approach, the evidentiary questions raised in this
Part are critical to effective operation of legal processes advocated by the
traditional, strict constructionists of the U.N. Charter.
There exists a remarkable absence of well-established international
law of evidence, even though the legality or illegality of uses of force
often turns on disputed facts.2 64 By this I do not mean a set of formalized
rules so much as principles developed through international legal and
diplomatic discourse that can be articulated and applied across a range of
cases. "Despite over one hundred years of international adjudication, and
sixty years of Security Council fact-finding," notes Mary Ellen
O'Connell, "we cannot point to any well-established set of rules governing evidence in international law in general or in the case of self-defence
in particular."265 Jules Lobel similarly laments:
Questions involving the standards and mechanisms for assessing
complicated factual inquiries are generally not accorded the
same treatment given by the legal academy to the more abstract
issues involved in defining relevant international law standards.
Unfortunately, international incidents generally involve disputed
issues of fact, and in the absence of an international judicial or
other centralized fact-finding mechanism, the ad hoc manner in
which nations evaluate factual claims is often decisive. 26
This issue-what evidentiary principles should inform capability
judgments-is critical to effective functioning of both an objective reasonable necessity approach and a process-oriented traditional approach,
to the extent that processes include collective assessments of WMD capabilities. Moreover, an examination of evidentiary logic points again
toward symbioses between the objective reasonableness and process approaches to regulating force.
A. How Much Uncertainty Is Reasonable?
One approach to reasonable certainty would begin with a specific
standard or burden of proof. In other words, rather than thinking about
what level of confidence is sufficient on a case-by-case basis, law could
set a generally applicable threshold that balances the relevant interests
264.
See Ruth Teitelbaum, Recent Fact-FindingDevelopments at the InternationalCourt
of Justice, 6 LAW & PRAC. INT'L COURTS & TRIBUNALS 119 (2007) (discussing evidentiary
issues in recent ICJ cases related to the use of force).
265.
Mary Ellen O'Connell, Evidence of Terror, 7 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 19, 21 (2002).
266.
Lobel, supra note 109, at 538.
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across the set of cases. Some have suggested, for example, that anticipatory uses of force ought to require "clear and convincing" evidence of a
coiing attack. Others would impose a higher requirement, tantamount
to an American criminal justice standard of "beyond a reasonable
doubt. '2 68 Along those lines, although not referring to the use of force,
consider ElBaradei's statement at the beginning of this paper, in which
he invoked a criminal standard to explain why he could not issue af269
firmative conclusions about Iran's nuclear weapons program.
The analysis above, however, cautions against simply applying a
specific burden of proof from another area of law to WMD capability
assessments. First, often these proposals of a specific proof standard focus predominantly on only one type of error risk: false positives
(believing WMD to exist when none do). To the extent that domestic law
and burdens of proof are a useful analog, the proper comparison is not to
criminal trials, which are premised on unacceptability of convicting the
innocent-hence, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which tolerates many guilty going free. 27" The better analogy is to some types of
civil litigation in which the costs of both false positives and false negatives are very high. As Justice Harlan explained in In re Winship,
"[b]ecause the standard of proof affects the comparative frequency of
these two types of erroneous outcomes [false positives and false negatives], the choice of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of
267.
See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. REV.
889, 889-90, 893 (2002); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Re-Leashing the Dogs of War, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 446, 452-53 (2003) (reviewing CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE (2000)). Ruth Teitelbaum argues that the ICJ applied something similar to a
clear and convincing evidence standard in its Oil Platforms and Congo v. Uganda judgments
related to self-defense. See Teitelbaum, supra note 264, at 125-26.
268.
The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for criminal conviction, held to be constitutionally required in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), reflects one possible balance of
competing harms with respect to criminal suspects. As Blackstone explained, "it is better that
ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 358.

269.
See sources cited supra note 2.
Moreover, to the extent that the criminal analogy is appropriate, the proper analog is
270.
the criminal justification of self-defense standard, not the criminal conviction standard. In
New York state, the standard for the lethal use of force in self-defense has a subjective component in addition to an objective/reasonableness component. To satisfy this subjective
component, a defendant must show that he "believed that deadly force was necessary to avert
the imminent use of deadly force or the commission of certain felonies." People v. Goetz, 497
N.E.2d 41, 51 (N.Y. 1986). Fletcher and Ohlin write that the subjective component is imposed
so that "the defendant cannot take advantage of circumstances beyond his knowledge and
intention"-or, in other words, it is imposed to prevent the pretextual use of force. FLETCHER
& OHLIN, supra note 129, at 105. They argue that "[tihe same rule should apply in the international context.... [In the case of Iraq, t]he claims about WMD must have been believed ....
The relevant question, therefore, is not justification ex post . .. but justification ex ante .... "
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litigation should, in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the comparative social disutility of each."27'
Consider, for example, litigation to terminate parental rights, in
which a faulty factual assessment could result in needlessly breaking up
a family (a false positive) or in exposing a child to abuse (a false negative).272 In setting a standard of proof for these cases, the Supreme Court
noted the particular importance of calibrating a standard that appropriately and effectively balanced false positives and false negatives, given
the finality and irrevocability of the grave effects of this type of state
action, and given the magnified risk of error in this type of proceeding.274 To this end, the Court rejected a "preponderance of the evidence"
standard, noting this standard's focus on the quantity rather than the
quality of the evidence 275 and its typical application to a class of cases
reflecting a lesser societal policy concern with the outcome (as in cases
where, for instance, money damages between two private parties are at
stake).276 However, the Court also rejected a "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard, maintaining that this standard is too high in cases where a
court has to decide issues difficult to "prove to a level of absolute certainty," with the practical effect of such a high standard being the
imposition of an "unreasonable barrier to state efforts" to accomplish an
important state goal.2 77 The Court consequently held that the most appropriate way to balance the risk of false positives and false negatives in
termination of parental rights cases, with their high stakes and their
fairly substantial potential for error, was with a "clear and convincing
evidence" standard, which "strikes a fair balance between the rights of
the natural parents and the State's legitimate concerns" and "adequately
conveys to the factfinder the level of subjective 2certainty
about his fac78
process.
due
satisfy
to
necessary
conclusions
tual

271.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring).
272.
See Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
273.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982).
274.
Id. at 762-64. The Court noted four reasons for this magnified risk of error: The
relevant substantive standards are "imprecise," which "leave[s] determinations unusually open
to the subjective values of the judge"; the court possesses "unusual discretion to underweigh
probative facts that might favor the parent"; the state is usually a more capable adversary than
the parents (for both institutional capacity and educational reasons); and parents have no double jeopardy defense in termination proceedings-the state can collect more evidence and re-

initiate proceedings as many times as it wants.
275.

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 764 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371, n.3 (1970)

(Harlan, J., concurring)).
276.

(1979)).
277.
278.

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754-55 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 768-69.
Id. at 769.
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The choice of any minimum standard of proof justifying the use of
force ought to similarly be framed in terms of the risks of both too much
self-defensive force and too little.279 It may well be that a high proof
burden is nevertheless warranted; after all, the Iraq war shows all too
well the potential costs of preemptive war based on mistake of fact. But
the notion that we should look to domestic evidence law principles of a
minimum evidentiary threshold does little to answer the critical
questions of where to set that threshold, or whether to set it with a static
versus an elastic standard.
The second problem with setting a single, specific proof standard is
that using a standard still requires the decisionmaker to analytically disaggregate the elements of the threat, which include both capability to
inflict harm (that is, the probability that a state has WMD) and intent to
use it (that is, the probability of the state using that capability in an aggressive or threatening way). There is something to be said for a "clear
and convincing" requirement if one believes that such a standard is calibrated to balance false positives and false negatives, but the referent of
that standard should be the WMD threat-a composite of capability and
intent. This suggests that the required degree of certainty about capability ought to vary with certainty about intent. The higher the likelihood
that an adversary would choose to use a WMD capability if it has or gets
it, the lower the necessary certainty of capability that should justify an
anticipatory or preemptive strike.28 °
Recognizing that both intent and capability are critical to an overall
threat assessment, and acknowledging that precautionary action might be
justified under conditions of higher doubt about capability as certainty of
hostile intent increases, one might nevertheless propose a minimum
threshold for both components. Christopher Greenwood, for example,
argues for a certainty threshold of both intent and capability: "[T]he right
of self-defense will justify action only where there is sufficient evidence
that the threat of attack exists. That will require evidence not only of the
possession of weapons but also of an intention to use them. 281 Such a
principle is appealing, although it still returns to the difficult question of

279.
See Dale A. Nance, Evidential Completeness and the Burden of Proof,49 HASTINGS
L.J. 621, 622 (1998) ("The now conventional understanding of the burden of proof is that the
level or weight of the burden of persuasion is determined by the expected utilities associated
with correct and incorrect alternative decisions.").
280.
On the difficulty of assessing states' intentions, see generally ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1976); Acton, supra note 87, at
124-26.
281.
Greenwood, supra note 37, at 16.
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where to set the appropriate minimum for each sub-part of the "sufficient" threat.282
The point of this discussion is not to reject the idea of attaching
minimum evidentiary burdens. Rather, it is to illustrate that the more
challenging issue is where to set the sufficiency line. That calibration
depends on weighing the relative risks of false positives and false negatives, and on assumptions about the future intent of states. One point that
can be drawn from the analysis in Parts I and II of this paper is that evidentiary thresholds that might have worked well in a world of
conventional threats-where capabilities could be judged with high accuracy and the costs of false negatives to peace and security were not
necessarily devastating-risk exposing states to unacceptable dangers.
Accordingly, they ought to be sufficiently flexible to account for the inevitable factual uncertainty and high security stakes of WMD
capabilities, as well as the specific hostile policies or ambitions of the
state in question.
And returning to the central issue of this paper, this still leaves the
question of what sorts of evidence or judgments should be relevant to
and should comprise the ultimate capability assessment: how likely is it
that a state has or will soon have a WMD capability?
B. What Type of Evidence Is Reasonable?

Besides the standard of proof, a second epistemic issue raised by the
objective reasonableness approach is what types of evidence ought to be
reasonably relied upon. The analysis above shows that the most obvious
and preferred type of evidence-forensic evidence of WMD capabilities
or programs-will often be insufficient on its own to meet a reasonableness standard, but that drawing on process approaches to assessing
capabilities helps to strengthen the utility of such evidence. This Section
also explores what other types of evidentiary logic might supplement
forensic information.
1. Forensic Evidence
The United States and Britain, in presenting the public case against
Iraq, cited numerous sets of forensic evidence to bolster their assertions
that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, and that it was
reconstituting its nuclear weapons capability. The forensic evidence included data from international inspections showing missing or

282.
Greenwood's use of the term "evidence" is significant for raising another idea
sometimes proposed for making objectively reasonable capability assessments: a transparency
requirement. See infra notes 296-300 and accompanying text.
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unaccounted-for weapons; 283 satellite imagery of ballistic missile components and WMD-related facilities;2 evidence that facilities previously
used for WMD production had been rebuilt;25 and Iraq's purchase of
equipment that could be used for WMD development. 6 Several pieces
of forensic evidence cited by the United States and Britain have since
gained notoriety for their inaccuracy. 287 For example, the United States
relied on discredited evidence that Iraq had deployed mobile biological
agent facilities88 and documents-later found to be forged-indicating
that Iraq had purchased uranium products from Niger.288
Claims about forensic evidence have also featured prominently in
U.S. and British public cases about Iran's nuclear weapon ambitions.
Specifically, government officials have pointed to international inspectors' discovery of a fifteen-page document describing the casting and
machining of enriched uranium hemispheres, which have no known use
except in nuclear weapons; 290 a laptop from Iran obtained by U.S.
283.

See FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUC-

THE ASSESSMENT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT 16 (2002), available at http://www.
fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf3/fco-iraqdossier (last visited Oct. 6, 2009) [hereinafter BRITISH ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ'S WMD]; see also U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4701st mtg., U.N Doc.
S/PV.4701 (Jan. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Powell Remarks].
284.
See President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Iraq (Oct. 7, 2002),
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/200210078.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2009); see also Powell Remarks, supra note 283.
285.
See Bush, supra note 284 ("Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past."); see also BRITISH
ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ'S WMD, supra note 283, at 20.
286.
See BRITISH ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ'S WMD, supra note 283, at 22 ("Some dual-use
equipment has also been purchased, but without monitoring by UN inspectors Iraq could have
diverted it to their biological weapons programme."); see also Powell Remarks, supra note
283.
287.
See Sarah Lyall, Britain Admits that Much of Its Report on Iraq Came from Magazines, N.Y. TImEs, Feb. 8, 2003, at A9; see also Walter H. Pincus, Report Details ErrorsBefore
War, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2006, at A26.
288.
SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ, S. REP. No. 108-31, at 150 (2004) (stating the assertion
was based on a source known as "Curveball" and was not bolstered by satellite imagery).
289.
See S. REP. No. 108-31, at 77-82 (2004).
290.
See United States Policy Toward Iran Next Steps: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Int'l Relations, 109th Cong. 26 (2006) (statement of the Hon. Robert G. Joseph, Under Sec'y
for Arms Control & Int'l Sec., U.S. Dept. of State), available at http://web.archive.org/web/
20060616215047/http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/63121 .htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Joseph Testimony]; SUBCOMM. ON INTELLIGENCE POLICY, H. PERMANENT SELECT COMM.
TION:

ON INTELLIGENCE, RECOGNIZING IRAN AS A STRATEGIC THREAT: AN INTELLIGENCE CHALFOR THE UNITED STATES
(2006), available at http://intelligence.house.gov/
media/pdfs/iranreport082206v2.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2009); Interview by Channel 4 News
with Jack Straw, Foreign Sec'y, U.K. Foreign & Commonwealth Office (Jan. 16, 2006), available at http://www.iranwatch.org/govemmentUK/uk-fco-strawinterview-01 1606.htm (last
visited Oct. 6, 2009); Interview by BBC I with Jack Straw, Foreign Sec'y, U.K. Foreign &
Commonwealth Office (Apr. 9, 2006), available at http://www.iranwatch.org/govemment/
UK/uk-fco-straw-interview-bbc-040906.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2009); see also IAEA,
LENGE
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intelligence containing thousands of drawings including a schematic for
a nuclear bomb test site, designs for a small-scale facility for uranium
conversion, and drawings of modifications to Iran's ballistic missiles in
ways that might accommodate a nuclear warhead; 91 design drawings
showing a heavy-water reactor at Arak with enough capacity to produce
plutonium for nuclear weapons;2 92 and traces of weapons-grade uranium
on centrifuges in Iran.2 93
To the extent it is available, one advantage of forensic evidence is
that as a type of evidence, it is universally recognized as legitimate, especially if it withstands public scrutiny. This is one reason why the
United States went before the U.N. Security Council with its photographs during the Cuban missile crisis, even though it had no chance of
294
obtaining Council backing for any action due to certain Soviet veto.
More recently, following a reported 2007 Israeli strike against an alleged
nuclear weapons-related facility in Syria, the U.S. Government publicly
released images and video footage to substantiate the claim that the targets were nuclear weapons-related facilities.9
A number of scholars argue that any evidence used to support precautionary self-defense claims should be made public and subjected to
international scrutiny.296 Some who urge this evidentiary publicity reImplementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by
the Director General,at 2, IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/87 (Nov. 18, 2005) (describing the contents

of the fifteen-page document).
291.
See William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks
to Prove Iran's Nuclear Aims, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2005, available at http://

www.nytimes.com/2005/11/13/internationallmiddleeast/13nukes.htm (last visited Oct. 6,
2009); Dafna Linzer, Strong Leads and Dead Ends in Nuclear Case Against Iran, WASH.
POST, Feb. 8, 2006, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.conwp-dyn/content/
article/2006/02/07/ AR2006020702126.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
292.
See Iranian Proliferation: Implications for Terrorists, Their State Sponsors, and
U.S. Counter-ProliferationPolicy: Hearing Before the H. Int'l Relations Comm. Subcomm. on

the Middle East and Central Asia, 108th Cong. 108-44 (2004) (statement of John R. Bolton,
Under Sec'y for Arms Control and Int'l Security), available at http://www.
foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/108/9451 l.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Bolton
Testimony]; Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, U.S. Permanent Rep. to the U.N., Vienna and
the IAEA, Remarks to the German United National Association, Bavarian Chapter (Feb. 7,
2007), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20071223161539/http://www.state.gov/p/io/
rls/rm/80203.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
293.
See David Gauke, Excerpts of Debate on Iran's Nuclear Programme, U.K. H. of
Commons (Feb. 1, 2006), available at http://www.iranwatch.org/govemment/UK/ukcommons-iran-nuclearprogramme-020106.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
294.
See CHAYES, supra note 248, at 84-85 (stating that the display of photographs at the
United Nations "was as effective in generating support for and neutralizing opposition to the
United States as any other action in the week of the crisis").
295.
See David E. Sanger, Bush Administration Releases Images to Bolster Its Claims
About Syrian Reactor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2008, at A6.
296.
See FLETCHER & OHLIN, supra note 129 at 169; Jonathan I. Charney, The Use of
Force Against Terrorism and InternationalLaw, 95 AM. J. INT'L. L. 835, 836 (2001); Lobel,
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quirement believe that greater public scrutiny of evidence generally improves its quality through debate and refutation, while others emphasize
the legitimacy benefits. 97 As George Fletcher and Jens Ohlin argue,
[t]he principle of publicity is critical in a self-administering system of law. There is no court to determine the facts underlying
international legal conflicts; there is no authority but the eyes of
the world to assess whether the United States had sufficient evidence9 to warrant its claim of dangerous and deployable WMD in
2
Iraq. 8
An assumption underlying these arguments is usually that much of the
evidentiary case about capability will be forensic evidence-that is, that
there will be something to be "shown" publicly.
Those who argue for public scrutiny are undoubtedly correct that
whenever possible the information relied upon to support precautionary
self-defense claims should be aired publicly, preferably before the use of
force. But there are several limitations of a public disclosure requirement
for regulating force. One practical problem frequently raised in response
is that key information often cannot be disclosed publicly without compromising critical intelligence sources and methods. 299
A second, more important limitation, to repeat the point
• 300from earlier,
is that forensic evidence alone will rarely be conclusive. Future confrontations with rogue states that might have WMD are unlikely to
feature Adlai Stevenson-type moments, with overwhelming and publicly
available forensic evidence to support claims about threatening capabilities. Significant parts of a public case will likely need to be inferential,
relying on reasoned deduction. This raises the question: what types of
inferences are appropriate?
supra note 109, at 547; see also WILMSHURST, supra note 44, at 9 ("The determination of
'imminence'... must be made in good faith and on grounds which are capable of objective
assessment. Insofar as this can reasonably be achieved, the evidence should be publicly demonstrable.").
297.
FLETCHER & OHLIN, supra note 129, at 161, 169; see also Lobel, supra note 109, at
547, 552-55 (arguing that public disclosure of evidence on which self-defense rests is required
under the U.N. Charter regime).
298.
FLETCHER & OHLIN, supra note 129, at 169.
299.
See Schmitt, supra note 46, at 113-14 ("A more reasonable standard would require
disclosure to the extent practicable in the circumstances."); Wedgwood, supra note 166; see
also JOYNER, supra note 75, at 292 ("The intelligence which states collect on WMD threats of
a nature which causes them such serious concern as to warrant a decision to use pre-emptive
military force, is intelligence of the highest sensitivity, and will have been collected through
means the secrecy of which the collecting state will protect at all costs. Information of this
sensitivity will simply not be shared by states with a group as diverse as the Security Council,
no matter who the collecting state is.").
300.
See supra Part I.C.
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2. Propensity Inferences
One type of inference-another common element of WMD capability assessments besides forensic evidence-is what might be termed
"propensity" evidence, or evidence about past conduct or a regime's decisionmaking or strategic calculus that shows likelihood that the regime
is inclined towards acquiring WMD. Especially given that assessing
WMD capabilities accurately is difficult because many components of
such programs could have non-military purposes, understanding the
likely motivations of states may be critical to making sense of forensic
data points.
In the case of Iraq, for example, the WMD Commission Report
noted that "any assessment of the effect of Saddam's political situation
on his decisions about WMD in the years from 1991 to 2003 would more
likely than not have resulted-and, in point of fact, did result-in the
conclusion that Saddam retained his WMD programs. 30' Looking to
Iraq's recent past behavior, the likely strategic rationale behind that behavior, and the Iraqi political situation, the intelligence community
assessed that Saddam was determined to retain WMD to intimidate his
neighbors and deter potential adversaries such as Iran, Israel, and the
United States.3 °2 More recently, the U.S. government has made similar
arguments in support of its claims about Iran's suspected nuclear weapons program, including that Iran has a history of violating arms control
treaties, that it publicly spurns relevant international legal commitments,3° and that its pattern of behavior is consistent with nuclear
weapon ambitions.
301.

WMD

COMMISSION REPORT,

supra note 67, at 147.

302.
Id. at 147-51.
303.
See Joseph Testimony, supra note 290 ("For almost 20 years, Iran systematically
violated its IAEA safeguards and NPT obligations.").
304.
See Bolton Testimony, supra note 292, at 21 ("Iranian President Mohamed Khatami
declared that Iran was no longer bound by any 'moral commitment' to continue suspending
uranium enrichment ... ");Sec'y of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Interview with Harry
Smith of Face the Nation, Sept. 25, 2009, available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rml
2009a/09/129674.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) ("I think it's really essential that we satisfy
ourselves and the international community, which has passed numerous resolutions against
Iran's program, pointing out that they are violating UN and IAEA obligations and the NonProliferation Treaty... ").
305.
See Clinton, supra note 304 ("This latest incident concerning the facility at Qum, it
would have been disclosed were it for peaceful purposes."); Sec'y of Defense Robert Gates
Interview on CNN's State of the Union with John King, Sept. 27, 2009, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4487 (last visited Oct. 19,
2009) ("[T]he intelligence people have no doubt that this is an illicit nuclear facility, if only
because the Iranians kept it a secret. If they wanted it for peaceful nuclear purposes, there's no
reason to put it so deep underground, no reason to be deceptive about it, keep it a secret for a
protracted period of time."); Joseph Testimony, supra note 290 ("The secret origins, military
involvement, acquisition of key technologies from a proliferation network, violation of IAEA
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A critical question for any legal mode of capability assessment, but
especially for the reasonable necessity approach, is when and how heavily to credit propensity inferences.
Take the suggestion made by both the U.S. and British governments
that Saddam Hussein's prior use of chemical weapons against his own
citizens revealed a likelihood that he still had, or was bent on reacquiring, WMD. In its public case about Iraq's WMD capability before
the 2003 invasion, the British government highlighted Iraq's breaches of
various international arms control conventions
and emphasized that
"Saddam has pursued a long-term programme of persecution of the Iraqi
Kurds, including through the use of chemical weapons. 3

7

In his U.N.

Security Council presentation, Secretary of State Powell reminded that
"Saddam Hussein has used these horrific weapons-on another country
and on his own people. In fact, in the history of chemical warfare no
country has had more battlefield experience with chemical weapons
since the First World War than Saddam Hussein's Iraq. 3 °8
What is the evidentiary logic behind such statements? Skeptics may
be tempted to dismiss these statements about past conduct as designed to
obfuscate a lack of evidence about present capabilities. And certainly
they are highly relevant to the issue of future intent to use WMD. Viewing them in evidentiary terms about capability, however, there are
various ways in which propensity inferences could factor into assessments. Consider the following syllogisms that might support claims that
Iraq had rebuilt or was rebuilding WMD:
*

A state that formerly had and used WMD is likely to have
them today (or seek them tomorrow) because its former use
reveals its strong belief in their strategic utility.

*

A state that was willing to use WMD against its own population in the past is the type of regime or has the type of
leadership ideology that is likely to have or seek WMD.

*

A state that commits mass atrocities against its own population deserves no benefit of the doubt, and instead should be
presumed to have or seek WMD unless it assures otherwise.

safeguards, false reporting to the IAEA, and denial of IAEA requests for access to individuals
and locations also belie assertions of peaceful intent.").
306.
See BRITISH ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ'S WMD, supra note 283, at 33-34.
307.
Id. at 44; see also DIR. OF CENT. INTELLIGENCE, IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM 4 (2002) (detailing Iraq's history of breaching U.N. Security Council
Resolutions related to WMD dating back to 1991).
308.
Powell Remarks, supra note 283, at 10.
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A state that previously committed mass atrocities with WMD
is unlikely to be checked from pursuing WMD by international law and processes.

In considering the reasonableness of relying on any such propensity
logic, one natural question to ask is how accurate the logic is likely to
be. After all, it turned out to be dangerously misleading in the Iraq case:
"Given Iraq's history with WMD, its desire for regional dominance, and
the weaknesses in its conventional military forces, the [Intelligence]
Community did not consider the possibility that Saddam would try to
achieve such intimidation and deterrence while bluffing about his possession of WMD."3°9 Political scientists have spent decades studying this
issue but there exists no consensus based on empirical data.3 10 It might
even be that those contemplating self-defensive force against a notorious
human rights-abusing state are especially susceptible to biased assessments based on culturally skewed views of state decisionmaking.3 '
It would obviously be helpful to have available reliable, direct measures of motive or intent-clear indicators of a state's state of mind-but
those tend to be hard to come by in international affairs,3 2 and most proliferating states proclaim publicly and privately their non-military
intentions. That said, as noted above there is no escaping some reliance
on propensity inferences because of the limits of forensic evidence and
the likelihood that many WMD-production or arsenal features appear
almost indistinguishable from non-military programs without some understanding of their likely purpose."'
Besides accuracy, a second question to ask is whether it is legitimate
to draw propensity inferences in these situations. Seen not through the
eyes of the United States but through those of weaker states-or
especially those who ultimately might be the target of precautionary
force-the idea that past behavior or strategic and political
309.
WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 67, at 151.
310.
See William C. Potter & Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Divining Nuclear Intentions: A
Review Essay, 33 INT'L SECURITY, Summer 2008, at 139; Scott D. Sagan, Why Do States
Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb, 21 INT'L SECURITY, Winter
1996-97, at 54.
311.
Cf Richard S. Bell, Decision Theory and Due Process: A Critique of the Supreme
Court's Lawmaking for Burdens of Proof,78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557, 581-82 (1987)
(explaining how American evidentiary rules are sometimes structured to compensate for widespread inferential biases). On the role of cognitive biases in shaping threat perception, see
Robert Jervis, Perceiving and Coping with Threat, in PSYCHOLOGY AND DETERRENCE 13

(1985).
312.
Indeed, one problem with discerning intentions is that they may not exist (a government may be undecided) or may change. See generally JERVIS, supra note 280.
313.
See Elbridge A. Colby, Making Intelligence Smart, POL'Y REV., Aug.-Sept. 2007, at
71, 78 ("It is precisely in the nexus between capabilities and intentions that the toughest intelligence challenges are to be found.").
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circumstances could give rise to presumptions of WMD development
will be viewed unsympathetically. The U.N. Charter system is built, after
all, upon sovereign equality. 314 In the eyes of weaker states, the United
States and other nuclear powers also have not lived up to their end of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty bargain, to provide civilian nuclear technology
to those who want it and to work toward their own military

denuclearization. 5 Yet these inferential judgments will inescapably
affect assessments of threats, if not as evidence of WMD capability
designs, then as evidence of hostile intentions or as reason to reduce the
overall standard of proof required for defensive measures. 316
One way to address these objections is to frame propensity arguments in terms of violations of U.N. Charter norms and Security Council
dictates, as well as other solid international legal norms. That is, it may
be viewed as more legitimate to draw inferences based on behavior that a
state has no right to engage in in the first place-such as activities prohibited by international agreements. It may seem hypocritical, even
cynical, to traditional view proponents to draw negative inferences
against states for violating international rules as part of an effort contemplating use of force outside the U.N. Security Council system. But it
has the advantage of channeling evidentiary logic-and ultimately
precedent-in terms of a common, universally respected set of expectations.3"7

See U.N. Charter art. 2, para I ("The Organization is based on the principle of the
314.
sovereign equality of all its Members:'); see also Lee, supra note 110, at 148 ("Sovereign
equality is the concept that every sovereign state possesses the same legal rights as any other
sovereign state at international law.").
315.
See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. IV, para. 2, openedfor
signatureJuly 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 ("All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy."); id. art. VI ("Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an
early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control."); see also Andrew Flibbert, After Saddain:
Regional Insecurity, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Proliferation Pressures in Postwar
Iraq, 118 POL. Sci. Q. 547, 557-58 ("[A]s a matter of political reality, probably all sovereign
states question the U.S. arrogation to itself of the right to limit their possession of WMD while
continuing to expand American capability and knowledge in this domain.").

316.

For an early expression of this idea, see

EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NA-

337 bk. 3, § 44 (S & E Butler 1805) ("When once a state has given proofs of injustice,
rapacity, pride, ambition, or an imperious thirst of rule, she becomes an object of suspicion to
her neighbours, whose duty it is to stand on their guard against her.").
317.
See Johnstone, supra note 167, at 440-5 1.
TIONS
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C. Burden-Shifting and Risk Allocation
Another reason why forensic evidence alone is likely to be insufficient to establish WMD capability assessments with high certainty is
because states seeking WMD may refuse to allow international inspectors or may fail to provide them with full accounting of their dual-use
activities. To what extent should such refusal contribute to a conclusion
that the state is hiding weapons or programs? Put another way, under
what circumstances should the risk of erroneous assessment be shifted
18
onto the alleged proliferators?
A major part of the U.S. and British case against Iraq turned on inferences about its refusal to allow U.N. inspectors full and unrestricted
access to alleged WMD facilities. President Bush explained in his October 2002 remarks to the nation that "[t]he U.N. inspections program was
met with systematic deception. The Iraqi regime bugged hotel rooms and
offices of inspectors ... they forged documents, destroyed evidence, and
developed mobile weapons facilities to keep a step ahead of inspectors." 9 The CIA in its public dossier similarly emphasized Iraq's pattern
of deception and withholding of information as evidence of WMD development.3 20 The United Kingdom, too, underscored "that Saddam has
learnt lessons from previous weapons inspections, has identified possible
weak points in the inspections process and knows how to exploit
them., 32' The implication of these statements was either that Iraq's past
behavior showed a likelihood that it was building WMD, or that the burden of proof as to its WMD capability ought to have been lowered on
account of its prior behavior.
But, again, in the Iraq case this logic proved misguiding: the refusal
to submit to thorough inspection did not reflect Iraq's possession of
WMD programs but may have even been designed to avoid revealing to
domestic and regional rivals that it did not have such programs. What is
somewhat ironic in the case of Iraq (and likely other cases) is that Saddam probably wanted some observers---especially regional rivals-to
draw a negative inference about his WMD efforts:

318.
Again, Vattel considered this problem, and suggested that "[neighbor states] may
come upon [a state] at the moment when she is on the point of acquiring a formidable accession of power,-may demand securities,-and, if she hesitates to give them, may prevent her
designs by force of arms." VATTEL, supra note 316, at bk. 3, § 44.
319.
President's Address to the Nation on Iraq from Cincinnati, Ohio, 34 WKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1716 (Oct. 7, 2002).
320.
DIR. OF CENT. INTELLIGENCE, supra note 307, at 5. ("In the absence of inspectors,
Baghdad's already considerable ability to work on prohibited programs without risk of discovery has increased, and there is substantial evidence that Iraq is reconstituting prohibited
programs.").
321.
BRITISH ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ'S WMD, supra note 283, at 19.
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[I]n an attempt to project power-both domestically as well as
against perceived regional threats such as Iran and Israel-Iraq
chose to obfuscate whether it actually possessed WMD. As a result, the U.S. Intelligence Community-and many other
intelligence services around the world-believed that Iraq continued to possess unconventional weapons in large part because
Iraqis were acting as if they did have them.322
Indeed, "even when there was nothing incriminating to hide, the
Iraqis did not fully cooperate with the inspectors, judging that an effective United Nations inspection process would expose Iraq's lack of
WMD and therefore expose its vulnerability ....
,323 Many believe that
Iran may currently be exaggerating its uranium enrichment capabilities
in order to create a perception that its nuclear development progress is
irreversible.324
When and how should negative inferences drawn from deliberate
failure to disclose information form part of a reasonable assessment? Or,
as a corollary, who ought to bear the risk of mistaken assessments based
in part on a party's refusal to provide accurate information?
In effect, drawing a negative inference (that is, that there is a greater
probability that a state has WMD) from its intransigence in revealing
information shifts some burden of persuasion onto the suspect state:
absent evidence showing that it does not have WMD, its impairment of
inspections justifies an inference that it does. Looking by analogy to
evidence law in the domestic context, such burden-shifting occurs all the
time. It is common throughout the law to place proof burdens on the
party with best access to information, or who can provide it at the least
cost.325 The evidential damage doctrine, for example, shifts the burden of
persuasion to the defendant in certain circumstances when he wrongfully
contributes to uncertainty about key facts, and "missing witness"
instructions sometimes allow adverse inferences against parties that
refuse to make available witnesses who could resolve factual disputes.

322.

WMD

COMMISSION REPORT, supra note

Agency, Regime Strategic Intent, in I

67, at 148; see also Cent. Intelligence

COMPREHENSIVE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO

DCI ON IRAQI WMD 34 (2004).
323.
WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 67, at 153 (emphasis added).

THE

324.
See David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, Allies' Clocks lick Differently on Iran,
N.Y IMES, Mar. 15,2009, at WKI.
325.
See generally Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1997) (using economic models to
show that properly assigned burdens of proof economize the transmission of information to
the court).
326.
See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 167-70, 240-41 (2005).
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There is also some precedent for such an approach in ICJ jurisprudence.327 In the first major ICJ case applying the U.N. Charter use of
force rules, the Corfu Channel case, the court confronted an issue of adjudicating disputed facts, over whether Albania knew or should have
known of mines illegally deployed in its territorial waters. Although
the court did not find that Albania's position as the party best situated to
prove or disprove the allegation was alone sufficient to shift onto it the
burden of disproof, 29 the court did note that such burden-shifting might
be appropriate in cases where such a party inhibits discovery.33 ° Moreover, it went on to explain that:
[T]he fact of this exclusive territorial control exercised by a
State within its frontiers has a bearing upon the methods of
proof available to establish the knowledge of that State as to
such events. By reason of this exclusive control, the other State,
the victim of a breach of international law, is often unable to
furnish direct proof of facts giving rise to responsibility. Such a
State should be allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of
fact and circumstantial evidence. This indirect evidence is admitted in all systems of law, and its use is recognized by
international decisions. 3 '
Perhaps similarly a state that refuses to disclose or permit inspectors
ought bear a greater share of the risk of erroneous military intervention,
since its refusal to provide information likely contributed to that error.
Probably in part due to the Iraq experience, IAEA Director
Mohamed ElBaradei avoided publicly drawing a negative inference from
Iran's refusal to come forward with required information: "if we do not
obtain the necessary information and if we do not get immediate and full
co-operation by Iran, we will not be able to verify the Iranian programme. And that is in itself a conclusion-that we are unable to verify.
But it is not a positive conclusion because it casts doubt on the whole
system.' 32 Rather than insinuating a negative inference from Iran's intransigence, on another occasion ElBaradei has said that "unless Iran is
able to provide answers to the Agency about our concerns, then we will

327.
328.
329.

See Teitelbaum, supra note 264, at 129-39.
See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
See id. at 18.

330.
331.

See id.
Id.

332.

Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Dir.-Gen., IAEA, Director General's Remarks to the

IAEA Board of Governors During Its Meeting (Sept. 9, 2003), available at http://
www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2003/DGIran9SeptO3.pdf (last visited Oct. 1,2009).
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continue to be in a position where we have to reserve judgment about
their programme. 333
While the Iraq errors demonstrate a need for caution in drawing adverse factual inferences based on a state's refusal to disclose
information, such a principle might still promote accuracy in the long
term if states then come to understand that their intransigence may shift
the burden of persuasion against them. Put another way, a burdenshifting rule like this has the effect of allocating risk of error to the subject state, which has greater incentive to comply with information
requests. In essence, a state that refuses to disclose or permit inspectors
ought to bear a greater share of the risk of erroneous military intervention, since its refusal to provide information likely contributed to that
error. Especially if one believes that deliberately feigning a WMD capability is destabilizing, shifting the burden of persuasion or shifting the
allocation of error risk may create stabilizing counter-incentives.
With regard to the legitimacy of such burden or risk-shifting, one
might object that states generally ought not to be required to open their
military and industrial secrets to the world, especially at gunpoint. Indeed, opening oneself to mandatory international inspections or military
information requests cuts deeply into the core of sovereignty, but generally such infringements are legitimate if based on international legal
obligation, especially consensual treaty-based regimes." Here law has a
powerful role to play, and again the process orientation of the traditional
view can help bolster the evidentiary logic so necessary to the functioning of objective reasonableness analysis.
Consider U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441, which contained
the following provision: "[F]alse statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq
at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation
of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's
obligations .... ,316
Most legal analysis of this provision has focused
on the so-called "automaticity" debate: that is, whether by declaring a
failure to disclose accurate information to be a material breach, Resolution 1441-by reference to earlier Iraq resolutions authorizing the
use of force to enforce Iraq's obligations stemming from the 1991 Gulf

333.
Press Release, IAEA, Director General Briefs Press on Iran/DPRK (Mar. 5, 2007),
available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2007/dg-iran-dprk.html (last visited Oct.

6, 2009).
334.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing the destabilizing effects of
perceived WMD threats).

335.

See Blix, supra note 184, at 9-10.

336.

S.C. Res. 1441, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1442 (Nov. 8, 2002).
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War-was automatically licensing the use force again.337 Also important,
however, is the evidentiary notion this provision laid down: that informational gaps or distortions created by the suspected party will be
interpreted against it.338 Such statements allowed Secretary Powell to declare in his U.N. Security Council presentation that "[t]he Council
placed the burden on Iraq to comply and disarm, and not on the inspectors to find that which Iraq has gone out of its way to conceal for so
long."339 While not going so far as to say that failure to provide information would give rise to negative inferences about hidden capabilities, the
marker laid down in Resolution 1441 at least helped legitimate allocation
of some risk of error to the breaching party by reference to a nearuniversally respected mandate that overrides, by reason of the Security
Council's primacy, baseline sovereignty expectations.
The case of Iran also shows how international legal processes-the
U.N. Security Council and IAEA working in tandem-can help legitimate evidentiary presumptions based on deliberate obfuscation. In that
case it has occurred incrementally. In June 2003 the IAEA reported that
Iran had failed to meet its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations by failing
to report on nuclear material, facilities, and activity. 40 In its November
2003 report, the IAEA took a half-step toward shifting the burden of persuasion regarding WMD allegations to Iran. While noting that "[t]o date,
there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and
activities ... were related to a nuclear weapons programme," it went on
to state that "given Iran's past pattern of concealment, it will take some
time before the Agency is able to conclude that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes. 34' In other words, a body
of forensic evidence that might otherwise be assessed in favor of the subject state would not be, in light of its prior practice of concealment. By
2005, the IAEA declared that Iran's history of concealment of nuclear
activities, coupled with the IAEA's lack of confidence in Iran's claims of
peaceful nuclear development intentions, raised issues of international
peace and security appropriate for the U.N. Security Council. 3 42
337.
See Greenwood, supra note 37, at 33-34.
338.
See Greenwood, supra note 19, at 690-95.
339.
See Powell Remarks, supra note 283.
340.
See IAEA, Implementation of the NPT SafeguardsAgreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General, para. 32, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/40 (June 6,
2003), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2OO3-40.pdf
(last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
341.
IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran: Report by the Director General, para. 52, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/75 (Nov. 11, 2003),
available at http://www.iaea.or.atlPublications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf (last
visited Oct. 6, 2009).
342.
See IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Resolution Adopted on 24 September 2005, IAEA Doc. GOV/2005fl7 (Sept. 24,
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Recently the Security Council referral process was used to further
build international expectations of disclosure and establish the proposition that Iran's lack of cooperation posed dangerous risks to peace. In
March 2006, the U.N. Security Council President called on Iran to take
steps required by the IAEA's resolutions. 4 ' Then in December 2006 the
U.N. Security Council passed a resolution expressing serious concern
over the outstanding issues cited in many IAEA reports and resolutions,
criticizing Iran's incomplete cooperation. 344 The March 2008 U.N. Security Council resolution criticized Iran's continued refusal to cooperate
with the IAEA and outlined further steps to enforce previously authorized measures to restrict Iran's access to nuclear program materials 3 45
This chronology is typically thought of in terms of escalatory coercive pressure, tightening the sanctions noose.3 6 Another way to view it,
however, is laying the legal foundation for evidentiary burden-shifting
through legal process.
D. Embedded Policy Questions
There is, of course, a danger in relying heavily on legal processes to
strengthen adverse inferences from non-compliance: If failure to abide
strictly by the disclosure terms of Non-Proliferation Treaty or other arms
control conventions is used not merely to assert a breach of legal duty
but as part of an evidentiary case to justify armed attack, potential proliferators will have less incentive to sign on to them to begin with. The
reliance on such inferences in one case may undermine longer-term efforts to combat proliferation, although the relative risks depend in part
on to what extent arms control and non-proliferation agreements themselves should be enforced through carrots or sticks.
More broadly, the use of force regulatory regime needs to be considered within a broader international legal context, including its overlap
and interaction with the non-proliferation regulatory regime. Although

2005), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf
(last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
343.
See President of the Sec. Council, Statement by the Presidentof the Security Council, U.N. Doc. SIPRST/2006/15 (Mar. 29, 2006).
344.
See S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 27, 2006).
345.
See S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 803 (Mar. 3, 2008).
346.
See generally Dennis Ross, Iran: Talk Tough with Tehran, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 8,
2008, at 38-39.
347.
See BYMAN & WAXMAN, supra note 3, at 201-25; Orde F. Kittrie, Averting Catastrophe: Why the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Is Losing Its Deterrence Capacity and How
to Restore It, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 337 (2007); see also Chyba, supra note 4, at 136 ("An
effective strategy for biological security will encompass nonproliferation, deterrence, and
defense, but the required mix of these components will be very different from those in strategies for nuclear or even chemical weapons.").
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the frequency with which precautionary force is used to combat WMD
proliferation will almost certainly remain very low, the arguments relied
on to support it will influence other states' behavior. A choice among
evidentiary principles ought therefore to reflect a judgment whether
WMD proliferation is best combated with coercive threats of military
force, engagement through international arms control regimes, or a combination thereof.
As stated at the outset of this Part, evidentiary principles of international law and use of force regulation will emerge, if at all, through a
process of international legal discourse and argumentation, not a formalized statement. 348 One value of working through the evidentiary
questions posed in this Part is to reveal the policy questions lying just
below the surface of use-of-force debates. The standard of proof question, for example, turns on how the relevant international actors aim to
balance false positives and negatives. This is a matter of calibrating
competing risks. The propensity inferences question turns on what conditions or behavior by "bad" states should diminish the benefit of the
doubt normally accorded to "good" states about activities that could signal WMD development. This is a matter of conditioning sovereign
equality. And the burden-shifting question turns on how best to promote
adherence to the non-proliferation regime. This is a matter of international diplomatic strategy.
The reasonable necessity approach helps bring these issues into focus, by demanding analysis of the substantive criteria that should guide
legal uses of force, which in a world of capability uncertainty includes
factual judgment criteria. The same policy questions, however, still percolate beneath the surface in the traditional view's world. Deliberative
processes like U.N. Security Council decisionmaking might force states
to confront these questions, but they might not. The policy and epistemic
challenges discussed in this paper are already sure to arise in the immediate term with respect to Iran and North Korea. In the longer-term, as
President Obama recently explained during his European diplomatic
summit, the countries will continue to pose dire transnational security
predicaments.3 9 Even if one ultimately concludes that the traditional
348.
See supra Introduction to Part IV.
349.
See Michael D. Shear & Craig Whitlock, Obama Callsfor a World Without Nuclear
Weapons, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2009, at Al; President Barack Obama, Remarks by President
Obama at Strasbourg Town Hall (Apr. 3, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress..office/Remarks-by-President-Obama-at-Strasbourg-Town-Hall/
(last visited Oct. 6,

2009) (outlining a new U.S. approach to combating proliferation, including arms control,
strengthening the NPT, and international regulation of nuclear materials). In September 2009,

the U.N. Security Council endorsed a U.S. resolution calling for nuclear disarmament efforts.
See UN Council Endorses Nuclear Curbs, BBC NEWS, Sept. 24, 2009, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8272396.stm (last visited Oct. 6, 2009); David E. Sanger, Secu-
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view approach is superior as to regulating force, the questions prompted
through the reasonable necessity inquiry should produce more informed
collective decisionmaking.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this Article was to explore how international legal
rules on the use of force should handle emergent and inescapable intelligence gaps and uncertainties about adversary states' WMD capabilities.
It argues that a reasonable necessity approach to use of force against
WMD threats-and with it an objective standard of assessing WMD capability-operating as a narrow exception to formal U.N. Security
Council authorization best balances competing risks. However, it also
argues that rather than viewing the process-oriented approach of the traditional view and the more fluid standards of the reasonable necessity
approach as mutually exclusive, they can operate in tandem to reinforce
each other. To do so effectively, greater attention must be paid to the evidentiary issues explored in Part III.

rity Council Adopts Nuclear Arms Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2009, at A4, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/25/world/25prexy.html?r= I&em (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).

